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1 Introduction – cause as the fundamental concept
In this paper we focus on Gödel’s idea of causality as the philosophical fun-
damental concept (der Grundbegriff ) and propose an interpretation of some
characteristic details of Gödel’s causal philosophy with respect, in particular,
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to his philosophy of logic.1 Although the available textual basis for such a
reconstruction is scarce and fragmentary, one general line of Gödel’s thought
is detectable that points to a causal foundation and explanation of primitive
philosophical and logical concepts. In addition, a number of places in Gödel’s
text that do not explicitly mention causality can be put in relation with his
statements made in explicit causal terms. Hence, it seems reasonable to try to
summarize what is available in scattered remarks of Gödel into one compre-
hensive picture. This picture will be related to some of Gödel’s versions of a
possible onto-theological axiomatization (Gödel, 1995d), with the intention to
give here a broader, informal philosophical context for these drafts.
Text sources for this reconstruction are Gödel’s Collected Works (Gödel,
1986-2003), Gödel’s reflections as published in Wang (1996, 1987) and Toledo
(2011), Gödel’s manuscript Max X (Crocco et al, 2017), a draft of the tran-
scriptions of manuscripts Phil XIV and Max XV (Gödel, 2016), as well as
materials from Crocco and Engelen (2016a), which contains many of Gödel’s
remarks from his Max Phil notebooks.2 Methodologically, whenever possible,
we try to reconstruct Gödel’s own view on the ground of his text. Otherwise,
possible views are proposed or suggested based on the text and on objectively
present interconnections between Gödel’s remarks.
It should be noted that Gödel’s Max Phil manuscripts, which we make
use of, were not aimed for publication, especially because of the “esoteric”
nature of many reflections contained therein, by far departing from mainstream
philosophy and science. However, they offer many deep insights of Gödel’s that
are relevant for this paper’s topic.3
Causality as a primitive concept is confirmed by Gödel’s statements from
different periods of his work, and, as stated in the quotations below in this
section, has a fundamental role. According to Gödel’s method (which includes
“idealization” by “disregarding the imprecision in what is actual”), new and
1 A formalization of a causal account of Gödel’s onto-theology is proposed in Kovač (2012,
2015), in connection with the discussion (philosophical and technical) on the so-called modal
collapse.
2 Many reflections from Wang (1996, 1987) and the reflections from Toledo (2011) stem
from the 1970s; the manuscript Max X was written from March 1943 to January 1944,
Phil XIV from July 1946 to May 1955, and Max XV from May 1955 and thereafter. For
the datation of Max Phil manuscripts, see Crocco and Engelen (2016b). In light of further
investigation and publication of Gödel’s manuscripts, we can expect new clarifications of
Gödel’s related views.
3 According to Gödel, “true philosophy” (Wang, 1996, 9.3.16 p. 307, 9.3.21 p. 308) cannot
be communicated to others as a “propositional knowledge” – what can be communicated
is only the method used, “attitude of mind” (Wang, 1996, 5.3.30-31 pp. 169-170, 5.3.35
and 5.3.37 p. 171). Moreover, the publication of “true philosophy” would be “contrary to
the world” and quite unsafe for the author (Wang, 1996, 9.3.16 p. 307, cf. 5.3.8 p. 166).
Although aiming at “true philosophy”, Gödel does not claim ever to have arrived at some
absolute philosophical truths (Wang, 1996, 5.3.30 p. 170). Yet, he held the opinion that
philosophers such as Kant and Husserl arrived at “true philosophy” (“absolute knowledge”,
“superscience”) but did not publish it. See footnote 126, p. 36 below, Wang (1996, pp. 166,
167, 169-171, 307, 308), and Kovač (2008, pp. 149-150). For Leibniz, see Wang (1996, p.
307) and Wang (1987, pp. 103-104, 224, 311).
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new primitive concepts can be discovered,4 just as some of the primitive con-
cepts can eventually be found to be definable in terms of other concepts, as
fundamental ones.5 Although Wang reports that Gödel said to him “on several
occasions” in the seventies that he “was not able to decide what the primitive
concepts of philosophy are” (Wang, 1996, p. 120, cf. p. 288),6 “causality” seems
to be almost constantly present on Gödel’s lists of primitive concepts. It should
be mentioned that it does not appear in the lists concerned with specific logi-
cal primitive concepts, nor in the list segment reported in Toledo (2011) and
van Atten and Kennedy (2003, p. 433), although the concepts listed in this list
segment are, for Gödel, essentially connected with causality, as will be shown
below.
In this paper, we claim that Gödel was seriously considering causality as
the fundamental concept of philosophy and, possibly, of logic (a reduction of
all primitive concepts to only one of them). According to his general attitude,
Gödel did not understand this idea as some definitely obtained truth (see
footnote 3, p. 2), and was permanently engaged in a search for philosophical
and logical foundations. With this caveat, a causal interpretation of Gödel’s
philosophy, including philosophy of logic, will be proposed, with its primitive
concepts causally understood. The view on logic as founded on the concept of
causality will be termed ‘logical causalism’.
We now refer to some of Gödel’s reflections that most explicitly confirm
his idea of philosophy as based on the concept of causality. In Phil XIV,7 we
find the following statement:
4 See Wang (1996, 9.2.19 p. 300, 9.2.22 p. 301).
5 We will sometimes call primitive concepts “basic” concepts, to possibly avoid the strong
connotation of their definite irreducibility. In Gödel’s usage, “primitive concepts”, “primitive
notions” (Grundbegriffe; cf. “main categories”, Wang 1996, 5.3.7 p. 166), are, first, unde-
fined concepts of some theory with axioms that “follow from the meaning of the primitive
terms under consideration” (Gödel, 1995f, p. 321). Secondly, “primitive concepts” are also
concepts philosophically considered to be fundamental, independently of given axiomatic
systems (“fundamental concepts”; Gödel 1995a, p. 337, Gödel 1990d, p. 121). Cf. Russell’s
distinction between “undefined” and “indefinable ideas” (Gödel, 1986-2003, vol. 1, p. 44,
introductory note by B. Dreben and J. van Heijenoort). In general, Gödel allows for a pos-
sibility that primitive concepts could once become defined in terms of “more fundamental”
or “undefinable” ones (“irreducible to anything more fundamental”; Gödel 1990d, p. 139). –
Regarding the “concept” itself, as will be shown later, its intended meaning is “just genera-
lity” (p. 28) but seems to be connected with some essential difficulties regarding its possible
axiomatic description (see subsection 3.3).
6 However, with respect to the theory of concepts (logic proper), Wang reports Gödel as
saying, “[W]e know what the primitives of the theory are which cannot be reduced to any-
thing more primitive” (Wang, 1996, 8.5.13 p. 272). – Gödel uses the term ‘logic’ sometimes
in a broader sense, comprising theory of concepts (intensional logic) as well as mathematical
logic (extensional, including set theory), and sometimes narrowly, in the sense of the theory
of concepts. We will focus on logic in the latter (occasionally considered as strict) sense. See
Wang (1996, 8.4.18 p. 268, 8.6.1 p. 274). For the inclusive sense of ‘logic’, see also in Gödel
(1995a, p. 334, ftn. 2).
7 When citing Gödel’s original pagination, ‘p’ for ‘page’ will be omitted.
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The philosophical fundamental concept is cause. (Der philosophi-
sche Grundbegriff is die Ursache.)
(Gödel, 1995d, p. 432; Gödel, 2016, XIV 104; cf. Wang, 1996, p.
119, 9.1.18 p. 294, 9.4.16 p. 315, dated 1954)
(1)
Gödel repeats this view on causation within the context of his philosophy
of force and fact of the 1970s:
Causation is fundamental; it should also explain the general and
the particular. (Wang, 1996, 9.4.5 p. 312)
(2)
It should be noted that, according to Gödel, the general and the particular
themselves constitute what is a “fundamental fact of reality” (Wang, 1996, p.
295).8 In addition, Gödel writes (6 October 1961, a letter to his mother) about
the principle that everything has a cause, on which the whole science
rests (Gödel, 1986-2003, IV pp. 438-439)9
and to which the “theological worldview” that “everything in the world has
a meaning” is “exactly analogous” (Wang, 1996, p. 108).10 Accordingly, in a
reflection from the 1970s, Gödel remarks that causation is the foundation of
time:
the real idea behind time is causation; the time structure of the world
is just its causal structure. (Wang, 1996, 9.5.6 p. 320, 5.3.23 p. 168)
Finally, causality is essential in the concept of understanding:
Understanding is . . . a step in the direction of reduction to the last
cause. (Wang 1996, 7.3.12 p. 235; see below footnote 118, p. 35)
A chronological note. Although the oldest of the above remarks stems, most
probably, from 1954, the roots of Gödel’s tenet of causality could be traced
back to much earlier times, before 1943, when Gödel began his systematic
study of Leibniz (1943-1946; see Gödel 1986-2003, vol. 4, p. 450). On the
other hand, this tenet was retained and further developed after he began an
intensive study of Husserl (in 1959; Wang 1987, p. 121; Wang 1996, p. 80),
for whom causality was not a primary concern.11 We mention some aspects
of the concept of causality that have, or most probably have, their origins in
Gödel’s philosophy prior to his systematic study of Leibniz. This study influ-
enced Gödel to apply a modified monadological view on causality (monads as
bearers of forces, drives, and representations; God as the “central monad”).12
(1) The reduction of time to a causal structure of the world originates from
8 See below footnote 90 on p. 27.
9 Cf. Wang (1996, p. 108) and Wang (1987, p. 217).
10 Cf. Wang (1987, p. 217). See Kovač (2015, pp. 163-164).
11 See Tieszen (2016, pp. 455-456). For Gödel’s critique of Husserl’s subjectivism, see
van Atten (2015, pp. 122-124) or van Atten and Kennedy (2003); cf. Wang (1987, p. 219).
12 “My theory . . . is like the monadology by Leibniz in its general structure” (Wang, 1996,
0.2.1 p. 8, emphasis added).
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Gödel’s comparison of Kant and Einstein’s relativity theory – this comparison
“always interested” him (Wang, 1987, p. 38, letter to his mother on 7 Novem-
ber 1947). On such basis, Gödel speaks about “Einstein–Kantian conception of
time”, where there is no real lapse of time – past events are as actual (wirklich)
as present ones (Max X, in Crocco et al 2017, 23; later, e.g., in Gödel 1995g,b,
1990b; see Audireau 2016, pp. 59-60).13 (2) Gödel’s view that Kant’s “things
in themselves” causally “affect” our senses, as expressed in texts from 1946 to
1949 (Gödel, 1995g, pp. 232, 248, 259, cf. ftn. 3 on p. 230, and p. 236) could
probably be applied also to Gödel’s earlier understanding of Kant, whom he
had already studied in secondary school in 1922 (Gödel, 1986-2003, vol. 4, pp.
447, 449). In addition, Gödel’s acceptance of attractive and repulsive forces
or “drives” (Crocco et al 2017, 6, 14; Wang 1996, 9.1.8 p. 292), retained also
after his study of Leibniz, may have its origin in Kant’s natural philosophy
(Bernard, 2016, p. 98, ftn. 33), with which Gödel seems to have been ac-
quainted since 1925 (Wang, 1996, pp. 68-69). (3) Gödel’s “conceptual realism”
(Platonism), adopted in 1925 (Gödel, 1986-2003, vol. 4, pp. 447, 450), is not
just “objective idealism” but may also include the idea of the causal influence
of concepts on objects – at least as confirmed in Max IX (November 1942 –
March 1943) (Crocco, 2016). (4) “Soul”, intellect, and cognitive subject (“I”)
as causal (wirkend) components are mentioned in Max VI (July 1942, Remark
381, in Engelen 2016, p. 179, ftn. 33). In addition, Gödel’s ideas on “working”
intellect can be traced back to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas (Engelen, 2013,
2016). We will come to these aspects in more detail later (see p. 34, including
footnote 113).
2 Primitive concepts and causality
In this section, some Gödel’s primitive philosophical concepts are analysed
with respect to their causal meaning. The focus will be on the concepts that
Gödel, in a remark from the 1950s (cf. reflection (1) above), considers as
involved by the concept of cause. Some remarks on Gödel’s late philosophy
of force and fact will be added in light of its relevance for a possible causal
foundations of philosophy.
2.1 Primitive concepts
Let us return to Gödel’s above-mentioned note where causality is referred to
as “the fundamental philosophical concept”, to see which concepts he mentions
as “involved” by “causality”:
13 Cf. also the distinction between the category of causality and a subjective concept of
causality, limited to the “effect in time” (Gödel, 2016, XIV 45). On Gödel’s philosophy of
time in relation to Einsteins relativity theory, see extensively in Yourgrau (1999, 2005).
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The philosophical fundamental concept is cause. It involves: willx,
force, enjoymentx, God, time, space\ast .
xHence life and affirmation and negation. \ast Being near = possibility
of influence.
...
Perhaps the other Kantian categories (that is, the logical ones,
including necessity) can be defined in terms of causality, and the
logical (set theoretical) axioms can be derived from the axioms of
causality. . . . (Gödel 1995d, pp. 432-435, slightly modified
translation, cf. Gödel 2016, XIV 104-105)
(3)
“Will”, “force”, “enjoyment”, “God”, “time”, “space”, “life”, “affirmation”, and
“negation” are introduced in the above reflection as basic philosophical con-
cepts with more or less obvious causal sense. Gödel is cautious with Kantian
categories, conceived as basic logical concepts,14 asserting that perhaps the
rest of them (beside ‘affirmation”, “negation”, and “possibility”, which are al-
ready mentioned in (3)), too, could be reduced to causal terms. We will come
to this question in Section 3.2, p. 23.
Many concepts mentioned in remark (3) are also recognizable in the fol-
lowing list of primitive concepts (handwritten page “Philosophical Remarks”,
around 1960, according to Wang):15
reason, cause, substance, accidens, necessity (conceptual), value-harmony
(positiveness), God (= last principle), cognition, force, volition, time,
form, content, matter, life, truth, class (= absolute), concept (general
and individual), idea, reality, possibility, irreducible, many and one,
essence. (Wang, 1996, p. 315)
Of course, some of these or closely related concepts are interdefinable in various
formal systems, for example, “necessity” and “possibility” in standard modal
logic, or “positiveness” and “to be God” in Gödel’s onto-theological system
from 1970 (Gödel, 1995d, p. 403).
Several other of Gödel’s, possibly only “initial”, lists of primitive concepts,
too, include “causality” and “substance”. In one reflection, Gödel mentions
“main categories”,
e.g., causation, substance, action,
and “their interrelations” (Wang, 1996, 5.3.7 p. 166). In discussing Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy, the following “philosophical concepts” are named:
apriority, causality, substance, the general concept of proof, etc.
(Wang, 1996, 5.5.5a p. 179)
14 For Kant, all categories have formal-logical origin, since they originate from basic logical
forms of judgements (“table of judgements”; see Kant 1968, B105, translated in Kant 1998).
As applied to what is given in an intuition, categories receive “transcendental-logical” (i.e.,
ontological) status.
15 E.g., “space” is missing, while “enjoyment” could be assumed as implicit in “life” in the
sense of remark (3).
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Additionally, according to Wang, Gödel mentions “object, concept, substance,
cause and sometimes a few others” as “primitive concepts” (Wang, 1987, p.
192), and suggests “God as one of the primitive concepts of metaphysics”
(Wang, 1987, p. 150).
As noticed, “causality” does not explicitly appear in the list segment re-
ported by Sue Toledo. In her conversation with Gödel, she recorded the fol-
lowing primitive concepts:
‘object’, ‘relation’, ‘will’, ‘good’, etc. (van Atten 2015, p. 102;
van Atten and Kennedy 2003, p. 433; Toledo 2011, p. 200)16
Some of the primitive concepts appear also as the most general concepts
in Gödel’s division of “things” (beings, entities), i.e., of “unities”, into objects
and concepts (Wang, 1996, 9.1.25 p. 295).17
Gödel’s above lists differ from the lists that we encounter, for example,
in Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz or Kant, despite partial overlappings and possible
inspirations by these philosophers. Variations of Gödel’s (partial) lists witness
his genuine search for primitive concepts, by a method of “idealization”, which
he saw outlined in Kant and Plato, and further precised in Husserl.18
According to Gödel, the meaning of primitive concepts and the relations
among them should be described and “explained” (cf. Wang 1996, 9.4.5 p. 312)
by axioms.19 This is what Gödel has in mind by requiring that a theory has to
be built for philosophy (metaphysics) in analogy with Newton’s axiomatization
of physics (Wang, 1996, 5.3.11 p. 167). According to Gödel, to discover these
axioms we should gradually clarify the meaning of primitive concepts – not
by means of giving definitions, but by means of a phenomenological study of
our acts and powers in the use of these concepts (cf. Gödel 1995c, pp. 382-
383; Wang 1996, pp. 159, 332). In this way, it should be possible to arrive
at some axiomatic system of causation within which all available primitive
concepts could be explained (and possibly defined by the most fundamental
ones). However, “the axiomatic method goes step by step. We continue to
discover new axioms; the process never finishes” (Wang, 1996, 9.1.30 p. 297).
Thus, in distinction, for example, to Kant, who claimed to have systematically
discovered a complete list of twelve primitive concepts (categories), Gödel looks
16 We follow van Atten and Kennedy (2003) and van Atten (2015) in having ‘will’ instead of
‘well’. For the causal meaning of these concepts, see below subsections 2.2.1 (“will”, “good”),
3.2.4, 3.2.5 and 3.4 (“object”); “relation” seems to be included in the meaning of the causation
itself (cf. Ursachenrelation in Gödel 2016, XIV 18, but also “causality” as a sort of “relation”
in Kant 1968, B106).
17 On one place, Wang terms the most general concepts “categories”: “The basic categories
of G’s ontology (i.e., the ‘things’ or all that which exists) are objects and concepts” (Wang,
1987, p. 193). See Remark on p. 28 below.
18 See Wang (1996, 9.2.20-22 pp. 300-301) with Gödel’s examples from Plato and Kant on
geometric method. For Husserl’s “Ideation” (Wesensschauung), see Husserl (2002, pp. 10,
138-139); cf. Wang (1987, 5.3.7 p. 166, 7.1.15 p. 218). In van Atten 2015, pp. 128-129 (see
van Atten and Kennedy 2003, pp. 459-460), Leibniz’s role is especially pointed out.
19 “The fundamental principles are concerned with what the primitive concepts are and
also their relationship” (Wang, 1996, 9.1.30 p. 297, cf. pp. 289, 244). “In a theory concepts
and axioms must be combined” (Wang, 1996, 9.3.10 p. 306).
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upon the discovering of primitive concepts as, in a sense, similar to “empirical”
work, without any guarantee to achieve completeness.20 After being acquanted
with Husserl’s phenomenological method, Gödel more precisely described this
“empiricist” “respect” – in clear distinction to the empiricism of natural science
– as “a priori psychology”,21 which could be conceived as a middle way between
apriorism and empiricism (in the usual sense). (On the “middle way”, see Gödel
1995c, pp. 380, 386.)22
2.2 General causal structure – primitive causal concepts
In remark (3), Gödel focuses, first, on some primitive (basic) philosophical
concepts meant to be understood in causal terms. There is hardly any secure
way exactly to reconstruct the explanations Gödel might have had in mind
while devising this list of primitive philosophical concepts. We will look for a
confirmation of his view in his different texts and remarks – if not precisely
of the basically quinary causal structure of remark (3) (1. will, 2. force, 3.
enjoyment, 4. God, 5. time and space), then at least of some of the components
of this structure or of its traces in a possibly differently understood causal
structure.23
20 Cf. “This whole consideration incidentally shows that the philosophical implications of
the mathematical facts explained do not lie entirely on the side of rationalistic or idealistic
philosophy, but that in one respect they favor the empiricist viewpoint. . . . [I]t suggests that
the situation in mathematics is not so very different from that in the natural sciences” (Gödel,
1995f, p. 313 and ftn. 20). Cf. also Gödel’s remark on “empirical content” as pertaining to
the existence of “something”, possibly also in mathematics (Gödel, 2016, XV, p. 64).
21 Van Atten expressed the distinction between Gödel’s intended “phenomenological psy-
chology” (“a priori psychology”) and empirical psychology (on “a priori psychology”, see also
Toledo 2011, p. 206) in the following way: although the first one “describes mental phe-
nomena”, it “is not concerned with individual concrete facts but with invariant forms they
instantiate and which delineate the range of possible concrete facts” (van Atten, 2015, p.
213).
22 What Gödel expected from his study of Husserl’s phenomenology was a sound founda-
tion (“thorough and systematic beginning”, Wang 1996, p. 171, 9.2.6 p. 298) for a possible
systematic discovery of primitive concepts (van Atten 2015, pp. 127-128/van Atten and
Kennedy 2003). This in distinction to Kant’s, as Gödel thought, “sloppy architectonic”,
which he criticized on several occasions, e.g., in Gödel (1986-2003, vol. 4, letter to Bernays
from 11 May 1961, pp. 186-188). Cf. Wang (1987, p. 226). However, it should be mentioned
that the paradigmatic work on the “completeness” of Kant’s table of judgements by Klaus
Reich (Reich 1948; Husserl being one of his teachers) seems to offer a clue to an insight into
deeper foundations of Kant’s architectonic.
23 Gödel often uses the term ‘structure’ in a general causal sense of “holding together”
(zusammenhalten) and “combining” (verbinden) parts in a whole. For example, “Der Unter-
schied zwischen einem Haufen und einer Struktur ist, dass bei der Struktur die Teile durch
die Tatsache ‘verbunden’ sind und diese Verbindungen selbst zur Struktur gehören” (Crocco
et al, 2017, 20); “The difference between a heap and a structure is that, in the structure, the
parts are ‘combined’ by the fact and these combinations themselves belong to the structure”
[our translation]). Gödel also speaks of “the structure of a concept” (Crocco et al, 2017,
80), as well as of logical concepts as the structure and the “putty” that holds together parts
of a given concept (footnote 87, p. 26 below). In addition, there are examples like “living
structure” (Example 1 below on p. 17) and “structure of the world” in a causal or some
other general sense (Wang 1996, 8.6.10 p. 275, 5.3.8 p. 166; Gödel 1995d, p. 404; Crocco
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This section outlines the Gödelian causal meaning of the concepts of will,
force, enjoyment, God, time and space, as well as of life, form and matter. The
next section focuses on the logical aspect of the primitive concepts. Although
it is not claimed that the causal components of (3), in the shape of some fun-
damental quinary structure of causation, remained an explicit part of Gödel’s
view ever after, we try to recognize this structure as at least implicitly present
in his reflections from various periods (distinct periods will be clear from the
citations).
It should be noticed in advance that Gödel’s account of causality is highly
nonconventional from the standpoint of many current views.24 Although it is
based on science, it is at the same time philosophical-theological, connected
with some significant philosophical views of the past (as those already men-
tioned), as well as with a sort of phenomenological method of intuiting con-
cepts.
2.2.1 Will (volition)
Gödel characterizes will (“willing”, see footnote 28, p. 10 below), most gene-
rally, as a conscious directedness towards its intentional “object”.25 Will may
be understood as a causal starting point, which directs (points) the causation
towards something as a goal. Gödel stresses that “willing” (like cognizing)
cannot be alone taken as a “fundamental concept”, but only as complemented
(“probably”) with the “good” (das Gute) as its “object” (Crocco et al, 2017, 69-
70). In one of his examples, the created things always want what they think is
“better”. Gödel offers this as an explanation of the things’ permanent creating
of something new in place of what is already created, as well as an explanation,
for example, of the Biblical Fall event.26 In the history of created things,
et al 2017, 90). Correspondingly, we can understand the five causal components of remark
(3) as constituents of a causal whole (“structure”), in which they are “combined” and “held
together”.
It should be noted that Husserl investigates “structures” of consciousness, noetic and
noematic structures, structure of “life-experience” (Erlebnis), where ‘structure’ has a general
meaning of ‘building’ (Bau, Aufbau), with a causal sense methodologically excluded (Husserl,
2002, 1995). Of course, Gödel used the concept of structure much prior to his study of
Husserl. In addition, he sometimes expresses his interest for something more than pure
structures (“But ‘the study of structure’ is a confession that we don’t know what the things
are”, Wang 1996, 9.1.10 p. 292). According to the analyses of this paper, this “more” could
have a causal sense.
24 As will be shown, Gödel’s concept of causation essentially involves a teleological aspect
of “directedness” towards an end (“good”).
25 “[T]he basic form of consciousness distinguishes between an intentional object and our
being pointed (gerichtet) toward it in some way (feeling, willing, cognizing)” (Wang, 1996,
5.3.28 p. 169). Cf. also footnote 61, p. 18 below. In Max XV, Gödel makes a distinction
between “will” and “willing” (Wollen, related to “ought”, Sollen; Gödel 2016, XV p. 66).
26 Since this is a significant note giving a broader context of Gödel’s causal philosophy, it
is given here, for convenience, more extensively: “Gott schuf die Dinge so, dass sie wieder
ihrerseits etwas ‘erschaffen’ können (darauf beruht letzten Endes alle Wirkung). Vielleicht
aber besteht darin der Sündenfall, dass sie nicht in diesen Zustand verharren, in dem sie Gott
ursprünglich erschaffen hatte (d.h. dass sie diesen Zustand nicht gewollt <haben>, sondern
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“what is better” might not always be reasonably conceived, and, moreover, it
remains in its proper sense unrealized until the “end of time”.27 In its proper,
unrelativized, sense, “better” is for Gödel “the good” (“worum sich letzten
Endes alles dreht”, Crocco et al 2017, 70; “what everything finally revolves
around” [our transl.]) and “value”, that is, in Gödel’s onto-theological remarks,
the “positive”, “perfection”.28
On the ground of Gödel’s versions and sketches of ontological proof, it
is possible to extract some essential properties of will. From the three onto-
theological axioms about the “positive” in the sense of “perfection” (as dis-
tinguished from the “positive” as “assertion” or “attribution”), in the sketch
of the ontological proof in Gödel (2016, XIV 105-107) and Gödel (1995d, pp.
434-435), it can be concluded that will, if directed towards the positive, should
1. be pointed towards a property if and only if the property does not imply
a negation of a perfection; i.e., the intended property (“perfection”) should
be “purely good” (“A property is perfection if and only if it implies no
negation of perfection”),
2. persevere in its intention towards a “perfection” irrespectively of possible
contingencies of the world29 (“The necessity of a perfection is a perfection”,
“Or if M\phi is a perfection, then \phi is too”), and
3. be pointed towards “being”, not towards destruction and non-being (“Being
is a perfection”).
In addition, since according to Gödel being implies unity,30 “unity”, too, is a
perfection, and thus an intentional “object” of will.
That “being” is conceived as a “perfection”, “good” and “value” is charac-
teristic for Gödel’s critical Platonism. This view overcomes Kant’s dualism
‘etwas Besseres’. . . )” (Crocco et al 2017, 12-13, emphasis added; cf. also Gödel 2016, XIV
64). “God created things so that they at their turn again ‘create’ something (in the end, all
effect is based on this). However, the Fall may consist in this that they do not persist in
the state in which God originally created them (i.e., that they did not want this state, but
‘something better’)” (cf. Mertens 2016, pp. 196-197, modified translation).
27 Cf. “Will is the opposite of reason” (Wang, 1996, 9.3.15 p. 307). Also, will could be
ineffective (Crocco, 2016, pp. 140-141). However, the final perspective is ultimately positive:
“Dieses Bessere erreichen sie auch schließlich, wenn alle Zeit zu Ende ist” (Crocco et al, 2017,
13; “They eventually reach this Better when all time is finished” [our translation]).
28 In Phil XIV, whence remark (3) is taken, “better” is an explanation of “value”. The con-
cepts of value – of “positive” and “perfection” – are crucial in Gödel’s ontological argument:
“The ontological proof must be grounded on the concept of value (p better than \sim p) and on
the axioms” (Gödel, 1995d, pp. 432-433, also 434-435). On the “perfecting” (Vervollkomm-
nung) and “perfection” (Vollkommenheit), which are implicitly connected with will as its
intentional “object”, see Crocco et al (2017, 7-8).
29 Cf. independency of the “accidental structure of the world” in Gödel (1995d, p. 404,
from 1970).
30 “[D]ie Einheit ist das Wesentliche des Dinges (bedeutet das aber vielleicht nur, dass man
alles als ‘eines’ betrachten kann)” (Gödel, 2016, XIV 81; “[T]he unity is what is essential
of a thing (this may probably only mean that everything can be considered as ‘one’)” [our
translation]).
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between theory and morals (“being” and “good”)31 but is not committed to
uncritical Platonism: it does not imply that “good” causes “being”. In light
of Max IX (Crocco, 2016), “good”, as a concept, “idea” (in distinction to a
“most perfect being”), could at most choose “being” to be good-like (i.e., to
“participate” in “good”).32
There are clear reasons prompting the understanding of Gödel’s concept
of “will” in the sense in which “will” is not only attributed to human beings or
to God, but in a wider sense, as attributed to each “monad”, although not to
the “physical world” (“material objects”) as distinguished from nature.33 This
follows from Gödel’s acceptance of a sort of Leibnizian monadology (see Exam-
ple 2 on pp. 18–19 below), with monads having “inner life and consciousness”
(“something inside”),34 and even with electrons as monads having drives and
representations (Wang, 1996, 9.1.8-9 p. 292).
2.2.2 Force
Whereas will is just the directedness to a perfection, force is for Gödel di-
rectedness to the realization of a perfection. This includes the directedness to
the realization of being, or, as Gödel expresses himself, to the “being of some-
thing”.35 Accordingly, in Max X, force is conceived as a “tendency” towards
the realization of a perfection of a structure, and that in the sense that certain
laws of self-preservation (i.e., of being) of the structure are obeyed (Crocco
et al, 2017, 6, 7). In examples of a structure such as a pair (dipole), “electron
event”, and a bodily organism, Gödel describes how attractive force takes into
the structure what improves the structure, while repulsive force resists and
repels what would destroy the structure. In this way, attractive and repulsive
forces contribute to the realization of the perfection of the structure (“ma-
ximum of the relationship between the parts”36) and to its self-preservation
(Crocco et al, 2017, 6-8). For instance, in Gödel’s remarks about “electron
31 Gödel warns of inconsistency in Kant’s moral philosophy: what has no objective meaning
should be subjectively (for the purpose of morals) assumed (Wang, 1996, 5.3.38-39 pp. 171-
172).
32 See Plato (1964-1978, VI, Republic 508E-509B, 517C), where “good” is taken to be the
cause of cognition, truth, and being (and seems to be understood as a god). Also, knowledge
and truth are said to be “good-like”, gajoeid\~h (Republic 509A).
33 See Wang (1996, 9.1.9 p. 292, 9.1.22 p. 295, 5.3.28 p. 169).
34 In Mertens (2016) it can be seen that consciousness in general has a high position
in Gödel’s ontological hierarchy (Max XI, from 1944): logical concepts, space and time,
matter, life, consciousness, angels, . . . , God. However, as in Leibniz, this does not exclude
unconscious states in a monad; on “unconscious pain” and “unconscious life-experiences”, see
Gödel (2016, XIV 65). Cf. Leibniz (1978a, §§14, 20-21 pp. 608-609, 610) and Leibniz (1978b,
§4 pp. 599-600).
35 Cf. Gödel’s reflections from the 1970s, where wish, as a kind of force, is characterized by
the directedness to “being something” (Wang, 1996, 9.4.7 p. 312) and “to realize something”
(Wang, 1996, 9.4.3 p. 311).
36 Presumably, non-interrelated parts could act each in its own way, dissolving the whole
to which they belong.
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events” (Crocco et al, 2017, 10, 13-15, cf. 5-6),37 force is understood as a “ten-
dency” (more or less strong, i.e., having some magnitude) towards or against
the emergence (Entstehung) of some event in the vicinity.
In addition, and in distinction to Newtonian force as a permanent “mean-
ingless striving”, Gödel’s force can cease in the moment of the realization
(Crocco et al, 2017, 5) as if this realization were its goal. Gödel’s remarks
suggest that what he has in mind is a concept of force as immanently “goal-
oriented” (Bernard, 2016). The acceptance of the immanent teleological nature
of force coincides with Gödel’s acceptance of attractive and repulsive forces,
which were rejected in Leibniz’s monadology and its separation of effective
causes (for bodies) from teleological causes (for monads) (see Leibniz 1978a,
§79 p. 620; Leibniz 1978b, §3 pp. 598-599).38
2.2.3 Enjoyment
From Gödel’s remarks, we clearly recognize that enjoyment (Genuß, Lust) is
for him essentially connected with the achievement of a state where some per-
fection (as a goal) is realized. This can be confirmed by several examples. In a
remark from the 1970s, happiness and enjoyment characterize a final human
state of fulfilled goals – there is “another world where there is no sickness or
death and where all marriages are happy and all work (every career) is enjoy-
able” (Wang, 1996, 9.4.19 p. 317). Further, since to be satisfied is included in
enjoyment, we can also refer to an explanation of the causal role of enjoyment
in a negative way: in the already mentioned context of the Fall (footnote 26,
p. 9), Gödel explains that dissatisfaction and “insatiability” (Unersättlichkeit)
prompt new creating.39 Obviously, a satisfaction with the reached state (en-
joyment) corresponds with a perfection achieved.
In particular, Gödel suggests that a variety of what is realized is a ground
of enjoyment (variatio delectat).40 This leads us to see that enjoyment corre-
sponds to “harmony” (Gödel, 1995d, pp. 432-433), as a realized unity in the
37 See also Bernard (2016, pp. 100-104).
38 See Bernard (2016, p. 98). According to Leibniz, some laws of motion need a teleological
explanation; cf. Leibniz (1978b, §11 p. 603).
39 “Der Sündenfall wäre also ein Fall ‘in die zeitliche Existenz’ wegen der Unersättlichkeit.
Aber das, was die Dinge selbst erschaffen, damit sind sie wieder nicht zufrieden etc.” (Crocco
et al, 2017, 13; “The Fall would be a fall ‘into temporal existence’ because of insatiability.
However, things are again not satisfied with what they themselves create etc.” [our trans-
lation]). Cf. also “satiatedness” in the remark from Max X quoted in footnote 56, p. 16
below.
40 Cf. the following passage from the context of (3): “[T]hat as many [things] as possible
will come to be – . . . this is the ultimate ground of variety (variatio delectat)” (Gödel 1995d,
pp. 432-433, translation modified; Gödel 2016, XIV 104).
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multitude and variety.41 Moreover, as can be expected, enjoyment is interre-
lated with the “beautiful”.42
It should be noted that “positive”, if conceived in a “moral aesthetic sense”,
as in the onto-theological axioms from 1970 (Gödel, 1995d, p. 404), obviously
refers to “good” as well as to “beautiful”. This is certainly a Platonic moment
(see, e.g., Plato 1964-1978, VI, Republic 508E), which, on the other hand,
once again points to Gödel’s nonacceptance of Kant’s (as he thinks) dubious
systematics with respect to the interrelation of the practical and the aesthe-
tical.43
We will use the term ‘enjoyment’, like ‘will’, in a wider sense, as compatible
with Gödel’s monadological views. For instance, Gödel seems to assume that
monads that are not living beings can experience pains (Wang, 1996, 9.1.8 p.
292), and thus, probably also enjoyment or pleasure.44 Gödel’s remarks allow
us to understand enjoyment, which is a part of a causation structure, as a
conscious state of the fulfilment (satisfaction) of will in a realized perfection.
2.2.4 God
For Gödel, God is the cause (“last principle”, Wang 1996, 315, quoted on
p. 6 above) of the world as a whole, and does not have any further cause
(God is “necessary in itself”).45 Each of God’s decisions is “fixed in itself”
(“an sich feststeht”, actus primus, Gödel 2016, XIV 74). On the other hand,
God comprises all and only the positive intended goals of our will, since ‘to
be God’ is defined by Gödel as ‘having each positive property’, that is, each
perfection – Gx =def \forall X(\scrP X \rightarrow Xx) (Gödel 1995d, p. 403; cf. also ca. 1941:
41 See Gödel (2016, XIV 76), where Gödel explains that, according to the “good principle”,
what was separated in an opposition becomes united, and he calls this unification (Vereini-
gung) harmony, in distinction to separation, which is disharmony. Cf. also in Gödel (2016,
XIV 103) and Gödel (1995d, pp. 432-433) that “harmony” implies “more being than dishar-
mony”. For the harmony in nature, see, for instance, Gödel’s example of the correspondence
of a “whole ‘organism’ ” of an “electron event” to each small disturbance (Crocco et al, 2017,
10), the example of an accordance in a “dipole”, where “the closer both parts are, the stronger
the pairs would act” (Crocco et al 2017, 5; Bernard 2016), and the following example of ac-
cordance: “at the same angle, there is the same color” (Gödel 1995d, pp. 432-433; Gödel
1995d, XIV 104). Noticeably, Gödel complains of a lack of sufficient understanding of the
concept of harmony (Gödel, 2016, XV, pp. 66-67).
42 Gödel implicitly relates enjoyment, as the opposite of sadness, with the beautiful: “[I]f
there were a completely hopeless sadness, there would be nothing beautiful in it” (Wang,
1996, on 27.2.1950 p. 43). Also, for example, “Slezak simply leaves out all the nonpretty,
since it is not enjoyable to write about them” (Wang, 1996, on 17.3.1962 p. 44).
43 See Gödel’s letter to Bernays from 1961 (Gödel, 1986-2003, IV, pp. 186-188).
44 Cf. “[E]lementary particles are a lower form of mind” (Wang, 1996, 9.4.12 p. 314; cf.
6.2.4 p. 191).
45 “Remark (Theology): The reflection: according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason the
world must have a cause. This must be necessary in itself [an sich notwendig] (otherwise
it would require a further cause).” (Gödel, 1995d, p. 430-431, Max XI; see Wang, 1996, p.
120). Because of the irrationality of will, we could understand that the complex: will – force
– enjoyment, determined by the intended goals, does not, in general, possess some such
“necessity in itself” that would guarantee the realization of positive values.
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G(x).\phi \in + \rightarrow \phi (x), Gödel, 1995d, p. 429).46 Thus, the causality that starts
from our will, according to Gödel, is nothing else than the participation in
God’s creation, and therefore, God’s causality is partly immediate and partly
mediate, that is, realized through His own creatures.47
The existence of God, not being in general evident, requires an argument.
As is well known, Gödel’s various drafts on ontological proof of the existence
of God from the 1940s to the 1970s are preserved (Gödel, 1995d, pp. 403-404,
429-435). Here, let us note that in Gödel’s ontological proof, there is no explicit
concept of causality48 – what is used for the formal presentation of the con-
cept of God (e.g., in the ontological proof from 1970) is the above-mentioned
definition of ‘to be God’ as ‘to be an entity possessing all positive properties
(perfections)’ and an axiomatically described concept of positiveness.
In distinction to Kant’s merely regulative and postulative ideas of God,
God is for Gödel a constitutive part of an all-comprising causal structure. On
the other hand, it seems that Kant’s criticism of Leibniz’s ontological proof,
with insistence that Leibniz, within his proof, showed only the logical possi-
bility of God, may have prompted Gödel essentially to change the proof of
the possibility of God as to show the real possibility of God by means of the
axiomatically described intuition of the concept of positiveness. Obviously,
Gödel was not satisfied with Leibniz’s proof based just on the conceptual
simplicity and unanalysability of the “positive”, which for Leibniz implies ob-
jective, causal priority (Futch 2008, pp. 110-114; Leibniz 1999a, p. 869; Leibniz
1999b, p. 872), but, on the contrary, wanted to analyse the “positive” as far
as it is accessible to conceptual intuition.
2.2.5 Time and space
The causal meaning of time, as indicated in Gödel’s remarks, consists in di-
rection towards what is “better”, in improvement, development, although, in
46 Cf. also Gödel’s remark that God is not definable without the concepts of value (“Gott
[ist] nicht ohne Wertbegriffe definierbar”, Gödel, 2016, XIV 118). At the same time, “God”
sometimes appears on Gödel’s lists of primitive concepts (see above, p. 6). This indicates
that the meaning of the concept “God”, for Gödel, may not be exhausted by the above
explicit definition (although this definition may be understood as a kind of description in
causal terms by means of the concept of positivity). Accordingly, Gödel notes that we do
not see as far through His essence (“weil wir das Wesen Gottes nicht so weit durchschauen”;
Crocco et al, 2017, 62) (where what is the essence of God, according to Gödel’s onto-theology,
is precisely “to be God”). One further hint is that, although God is defined by having all
positive properties, He is simple, in some not fully understood sense: “Das ‘Einfache’ an Gott
is vielleicht, dass nur eine Art von Gut in höchster Intens<ität ist>?” (Crocco et al, 2017,
70; “The ‘simple’ on God is perhaps that only one sort of good is in the highest intensity?”
[our translation]).
47 Cf. “weil wir durch unseren Willensfreiheit am Schöpfen Gottes teilnehmen (Gott schafft
den Menschen sich zum Bilde)” (Gödel 2016, XIV 77; “because we participate through our
freedom of will on God’s creation (God creates the man as an image of Himself)” [our trans-
lation]). Cf. the remark quoted in footnote 26, p. 9. The idea of “created creators” in Gödel’s
theological view was drawn to my attention by Paul Weingartner. For his interpretation (in
connection with Thomas Aquinas), see Weingartner (2016, p. 466).
48 See footnote 1, p. 2 above.
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the factual conditions of this world, time could also lead towards destruction
(Gödel, 2016, XIV 19). The causation itself is perceived as the flow of time.49
Further, in an idealized sense, the past is, for Gödel, that which we cannot in-
fluence anymore (“worauf man nicht mehr einwirken kann”, Crocco et al 2017,
22) and what is known (das Gewusste, Gödel 2016, XIV 19). On the other
hand, the future is dependent on us (ideally, “what we can produce”, “das von
uns Erzeugbare”), and what is unknown, having its foundation (Begründung)
in the past (Gödel, 2016, XIV 19, 17). In distinction, for example, to Leibniz’
theory, time is, for Gödel, in itself non-objective, “no specific character of be-
ing”, just our subjective way of the perceiving of the “causal structure” of the
world (Wang, 1996, 9.5.10, 9.5.6, 9.5.5 on p. 320, 5.3.23 p. 168, 9.4.10 p. 313).
On the ground of his understanding of relativistic theory, Gödel completely
reduces the objective meaning of time to a timeless causal structure.50
As indicated in Gödel’s remark (3), space is just the needed “nearness”
(Nahesein) between components of a causation event, which makes causa-
lity possible.51 Space is an unstable structure (Crocco et al 2017, 10, 13-14;
see Bernard 2016), which is being disturbed as well as stabilized by attrac-
tive and repulsive forces that are active in the vicinity of objects.52 Although
mutual nearness implies a sort of “coexistence”, which is at the core of the
Leibnizian understanding of space (Leibniz, 1863, p. 18), it nevertheless can-
not be concluded that Gödel would accept coexistence in Leibniz’s sense as
“simultaneity”.53 It seems that Gödel has evolved in his conception of space
from an objectivistic understanding of relativistic space-time, to monadolo-
gical, essentially subjective, but still causally conceived space, as determined
by drives and representations of monads (see Example 2, “Monadology”, pp.
18–19 below).
49 “Das Wahrnehmen des ‘Fließens’ ist die direkte Wahrnehmnug der Erzeugung oder Ur-
sachenrelation” (Gödel 2016, XIV 18; “The perception of ‘flow’ is the direct perception of
the generating or causal relation” [our translation]).
50 See Gödel (1990b) and Yourgrau (2005, 1999). Also: “Causation is unchanging in time
and does not imply change. . . . Change is subjective in the Einstein universe” (Wang, 1996,
9.5.9 p. 320); “As we present time to ourselves, it simply does not agree with fact” (Wang,
1996, 5.3.23 p. 168). In distinction, for Leibniz, the linear order of time is based on the
structure of spatio-causal events (see Leibniz 1863, p. 18, and Futch 2008, pp. 118-125).
51 “Being near = possibility of influence” (“Möglichkeit der Einwirkung”) (Gödel 1995d, pp.
434-435; Gödel 2016, XIV 104). “Räumliche Nähe bedeutet offenbar: gegenseitige Beeinflus-
sbarkeit” (Gödel 2016, XIV 19; “Spatial nearness means obviously: mutual influenceability”
[our translation]). For the role of nearness in an “electron event”, see Crocco et al (2017,
13-14).
52 Cf. also Gödel’s remark: “We understand space only through the drive of the objects in
space; otherwise we have no idea what space is” (Wang, 1996, 9.1.10 p. 292).
53 For Leibniz’s understanding of time and space, see Futch (2008, pp. 118-125, 152-160).
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2.2.6 Life
According to remark (3), life is involved in will and enjoyment (daher das
Leben).54 In a remark from Max X (Crocco et al, 2017, 7-8), Gödel describes
the life of a bodily organism as an “imperfect structure”, which is in “constant
perfecting by means of what does not generate a complete perfection”.55 In ad-
dition, Gödel speaks of life in a more general and fundamental sense (not just
in the sense of material exchange) and distinguishes “very imperfect life” (in
this world) and the “perfect life afterwards” (a reflection from the 1970s; Wang
1996, 9.4.19 p. 317).56 In these descriptions, we can recognize a will for perfec-
tion, and enjoyment, at first, in a partially realized perfection, with the per-
spective of an enjoyment in a more fully realized perfection. Gödel’s remarks
lead to an understanding of will as a choice of the perfections to be achieved,
and enjoyment as the realization of these perfections. Non-enjoyment, as non-
fulfillment of a chosen value, results in the will to continue further, towards
new attempts of possible future fulfillment (continuation of life). What con-
nects will and enjoyment is force as “tendency”, conatus, like Leibnizian “live
force” (Crocco et al, 2017, 44),57 which preserves the life structure by attract-
ing what rebuilds the structure and by repelling what is destructive for it (see
here footnote 55).
It should be noted that, for Gödel, life as a component of causation does not
exclude mechanical causality. Gödel remarks that, for Leibniz, in “monads of
the lowest kind” (“Monaden niederster Gattung”), and only in them, causality
is purely mechanical, in the sense that what is currently happening in them
depends just on what has previously happened in them (Crocco et al, 2017,
42). This should still involve a sort of “inner life” (at least according to Gödel’s
later reflections) – experience or representations (of objects in space), which
are properties of monads in general (Wang, 1996, 9.1.8-9 pp. 291-292).58
54 As reproduced by Wang: “Will and enjoyment lead to life and affirmation and negation”
(Wang 1996, 9.4.16 p. 315).
55 “Das Leben is offenbar eine unvollkommene Struktur, welche daher Materia von außen
anzieht [nämlich Sauerstoff, Kohlenhydr<ate>, Aminosäuren] und diese in Struktur auf-
nimmt. Die neue Struktur übt offenbar wieder eine ‘Zerfallungskraft’ auf sich selbst aus,
sodass Harnstoff and Kohlensäure abgegeben werden” (Crocco et al, 2017, 7). (“Life is obvi-
ously an imperfect structure which because of that attracts matter from the outside [namely
oxygen, carbohydrates, and amino acids] and receives them into structure. The new struc-
ture again obviously exerts a ‘dissociation force’ on itself, so that urea and carbonic acids
are emitted.” Cf. translations in Mertens 2016 and Bernard 2016, here slightly modified).
56 See also in an already mentioned remark from Max X: “Aber vielleicht gibt es die Speise,
die für alle Zeit satt macht? Und den Atemzug, der alles weitere Atmen überflüssig macht”
(Crocco et al 2017, 7-8; “However, maybe there is food that satiates for all time? And the
breath that makes all further breathing superfluous”; see translations in Bernard 2016, p.
101, and Mertens 2016, p. 196, here slightly modified).
57 “Life force is a primitive element of the universe and it obeys certain laws of action”
(Wang, 1996, 6.2.12 p. 193).
58 Gödel does not argue for animism, since for him, for example, the physical world “is
inanimate” (Wang, 1996, 9.1.22 p. 295). But as soon as we have some whole built of matter,
an additional, possibly animate, component is needed. “For something to be a whole, it has
to have an additional object, say, a soul or a mind” (Wang 1996, 9.4.12 p. 314; cf. “In the
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2.2.7 Form, matter
The concepts of form and matter, which appear on Gödel’s lists of primitive
concepts, are recognizable in the above analysis in the relationship between
force and space. According to Gödel, the instable space structure is “in a sense
materia prima” (Crocco et al, 2017, 10, 14), which is being formed by a dis-
turbing or stabilizing force (on Gödel’s “hylomorphism”, cf. Bernard 2016). Of
course, the concept pair “form – matter” historically stems from Aristotle.59
The same should hold about “real time”, since time is “in relativity theory
. . . like far and near in space” (Wang, 1996, 9.5.10 p. 320). The form-matter
relationship can be recognized in our subjective perception of time in the re-
lation of past and future (past as that which influences the future; see above,
p. 15), although, as mentioned, this is just our “non-objective” way of repre-
senting the real causal structure.
2.3 Examples of a causal structure
Let us give a few examples of causation that clearly show the quinary causal
structure sketched in remark (3).
Example 1. Bodily organism. Max X, Crocco et al (2017, 7-8).
In this remark (see footnote 55, p. 16), Gödel describes the life of a bodily
organism, which consists in the constant exchange of matter between a living
structure and its environment. The causal components of this structure can
be discerned as follows:
1. will to be better, satiated, perfect;
2. force to attract and intake oxygen, carbohydrates, and amino acids, and
(repulsive) “force of dissociation” to give off urea and carbonic acid;
3. perfectedness (to be improved, satieted), although without, or just possibly
with, full perfection (perfect satiety, “perfect breath”) [enjoyment ];
4. living being as a creator created by God, re-creates its bodily living struc-
ture (see Crocco et al 2017, 12);
5. the direction of prior-posterior (time) in the experience of exchange of mat-
ter, and the nearness of the outside space (from which matter is attracted
case of matter, for something to be whole, it has to have an additional object”, Wang 1996,
6.2.9 p. 192).
59 If “drive” is understood as involving “force”, Gödel’s reflection about the understanding
of space by means of the drive of objects in space (see footnote 52, p. 15 above) could
also be seen as implying form–matter relationship. A sort of acceptance of Aristotelian
primitive concepts does not contradict Gödel’s Platonism. Besides “form” and “matter”,
concepts “substance” and “accident”, too, can normally be found in Gödel’s lists of primitive
concepts. In an analysis of a possible Gödelian sense of these concepts it should be abstracted
from Aristotelian realism, where concepts are only “parts or aspects of things”, since Gödel,
Platonically, accepts the separate objective “world” of concepts, which are “things” but not
objects. See “Gibbs lecture” in Gödel (1995f, p. 321) and Gödel’s distinction between objects
and concepts (here, pp. 7 and 28).
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and into which it is given off) and the inside space (where matter is taken
in, and from where it is given off).
Example 2. Monadology. We refer to Gödel’s explicit account of monadology
in Wang (1996) from the 1970s and elsewhere.
1. Will of monads is involved in Gödel’s mentioning of the consciousness of
a monad (Wang, 1996, 9.1.8, 9.1.9 on pp. 291-292, “inner life or conscious-
ness”) since “willing” is a way in which consciousness is “pointed” towards
its intentional object (Wang, 1996, 5.3.28 p. 169).60 It should be noted
that, in Max X, will is an inseparable part of attentive acts.61
2. Force of monads seems to be meant by their “drive” (appetitus), with at-
traction and repulsion of electrons as an example, obeying “laws of the
interactions of monads”.62
3. Gödel mentions that monads experience pain, which naturally implies that
its opposite, enjoyment, too, should be included in their possible experi-
ence. This is clearly connected with Gödel’s mentioning of happiness and
sadness (miserability) in a human monad’s life (Wang, 1996, 9.4.19-20 pp.
316-317).63
4. God has the role of “a central monad” (Wang, 1996, 9.1.2 p. 290, March
1976 p. 309) (see the comment below, immediately after 5.).
5. Although time, as mentioned, does not have for Gödel objective meaning,
it seems to be essential for monads as minds: according to Gödel, “time
is the only natural frame of reference” for mind (while space-time is natu-
ral for the physical world) (Wang, 1996, 9.5.1 p. 319). Gödel expected to
be able to come to the understanding of time especially by a Husserlian
phenomenological observation of the “working of the mind” (Wang, 1996,
9.5.3 p. 319). According to Gödel, what is space can be understood only by
means of drives of objects, e.g., monads (like electrons), “in space”, although
monads themselves are not in space. What suggests itself, as mentioned
earlier, is that space is just “nearness” (1954), in which drives of monads
are actualized, and “contiguity” (Wang, 1996, 9.1.10 p. 292), which makes
possible that “objects represent one another” (and, presumably, interact).
60 See footnote 25 on p. 9 above.
61 Cf. Crocco et al (2017, 59), with reference to Leibniz: “[M]an richtet die Aufmerksamkeit
nur auf das, was dem, was man will, günstig ist” (emphasis added; “[O]ne directs the attention
only on what is favourable to what one want” [our translation]).
62 E.g., Gödel, opposing Herbart, refers to “Leibnizian force” in the sense of the inner
“principle of change” in monads (Gödel, 2016, XIV 83). Cf. Wang’s interpretation: “Objects
are, in the first place, the monads, whose appetition is force” (Wang, 1996, pp. 312, cf. pp.
311, 310; appetition as “the tendency to go from state to state”). However, in Leibniz’s Mo-
nadology, drives are conceived as “imitations” of God’s will, which is, in turn, an infinite and
perfect drive (Leibniz, 1978a, §48 p. 615). – As mentioned above, attraction and repulsion
are non-Leibnizian aspects of Gödel’s monadology (Bernard, 2016). The similar holds of
“interactions of monads”, if what is meant is not just an “ideal influence”, since, according
to Leibniz, no outer cause can influence the interior of a monad (Leibniz, 1978a, §11 p. 608,
§51 p. 615). On monads “without windows”, see Gödel’s remark in Max X (Crocco et al,
2017, 34).
63 Also, according to Leibniz, there is under God’s government no good action without
reward, and no bad action without a punishment (Leibniz, 1978a, §90 p. 622).
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Monadology led Gödel to endorse the subjectivity of space, in particular
in the sense of “mutual sensation of being near” (“for lifeless matter, too”)
with at least statistic objectivity.64
According to Gödel, his monadology should be Leibnizian in its “general struc-
ture” (with some differences as mentioned in footnote 62 on p. 18, and on p. 12
above). For example, in Leibniz’s monadology, we can find Gödel’s first three
causal components (will, force and enjoyment) as centred in God (the fourth
component): (1) God is the “architect” and efficient cause of our “being”, (2)
He is the end of our will, and (3) only in Him we can find happiness. As to
(1), God possesses creative force (puissance); regarding (2), God has goodness
and will that always chooses what is better; regarding (3), God is most perfect
and Himself most happy (Leibniz 1978a, §90 pp. 622-623, §55 p. 616, §48 p.
615; Leibniz 1978b, §16 p. 605, §18 p. 606, §9 pp. 602-603).
Let us note the difference between Gödel’s accounts of electrons in Max
X and in Wang (1996) (connected with the change in Gödel’s conception of
space). In distinction to the account in the 1970s, in Max X electrons are not
monads, but “electron events”, with their inner structure (they are composed);
there, no consciousness, experience or representation in electrons is mentioned.
An intermediate stance can be found in Gödel (2016, XIV 77), where Gödel is
considering “entelechies” as possible “higher harmonizers” (for the establishing
of unity) for elementary particles in quantum mechanics.
Since Gödel’s system of primitive causally interpreted concepts is obvi-
ously theistic, and, moreover, since it is known that Gödel was dedicated to
an in-depth reading of the Bible (as can be seen already from the Fall example
above; see also Wang 1996, p. 51), we illustrate how his conceptual system
might work in the following example.
Example 3. Creation of light (not from Gödel’s text, Gen 1:1-5).
We paraphrase some parts of the text of Genesis 1 and emphasize the
causal components following remark (3):
1. God wanted light – at first, it was dark (“darkness over the abyss”) [will ];
2. creative force of Word – “Then God said: Let there be light”;
3. enjoyment of light – “. . . there was light. God saw that the light was good”;
4. God, who is the cause “necessary in itself” and the cause of the world (cf.
Max XI, p. 149, in Gödel 1995d, p. 430), is the first “subject” (agent) of
the creation;
5. initially, there was the formless and shapeless earth, darkness, and “a
mighty wind sweeping over the water” (materia prima, unstable space);
64 “Die räumlichen Beziehungen (auch die makroskopischen) bedeuten objectiv nichts, son-
dern gelten nur mit Bezug auf uns, und zwar a) sie bedeuten wenigstens stat.<isch> etwas
Objektives\ast (\ast z.B. gegenseitig Empfinden des Naheseins)(aber Ausnahme z.B. wenn zwei
Wesen voneinander träumen)” (Gödel, 2016, XIV 69). (“The space relations (the macro-
scopic ones, too) mean nothing objective, but hold merely with respect to us, and that, a)
they mean at least statistically something objective\ast (\ast e.g., mutual sensation of nearness)
(but the exception, e.g., when two beings dream about one another)” [our translation]).
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then, by the creation of light and the separation of the light from the dark-
ness, there was the first day [time]; thereafter, by the creation of the sky
with the separation of upper and lower waters, and by the creation of the
land and the sea, space was formed and stabilized.
2.4 Reduction to force (wish) and fact
In the course of time Gödel aimed at a further reduction of the above causal
structure. According to what Wang reports, Gödel’s causality picture was in
November 1975 quite succinct:
The meaning of the world is the separation of fact and force.
(Wang, 1996, 9.4.3 p. 311)
Assuming that the meaning of the world should be determined also with re-
spect to thinking beings, and hence with respect to wish since “wish is force as
applied to thinking beings, to realize something” (Wang, 1996, 9.4.3 p. 311),
Wang reports of Gödel’s following variant formulation:
The meaning of the world is the separation of wish and fact.
(Wang, 1996, 9.4.1 p. 309; pp. 287, 294)
Similarly: “The meaning of the whole world is the separation (and the union)
of fact and wish” (Wang, 1996, 9.4.3 p. 311).
Here, a causal structure includes force (wish), fact,65 union, and separation.
Causal components of remark (3) remain explicitly or implicitly included in the
newly outlined structure. Thus, this structure can be described as consisting
of
1. force to realize (to put into “being”) some value or perfection as intended
by will ;
2. fact (encountered by force), possibly empirical (Wang, 1996, 9.4.9 p. 312),
that is, related to the sensual space-time objects,66 or just some spatial-
temporal, logical or mathematical structure, where “something” may not
be realized (have “being”);67
3. the separation of force and fact before the realization of a value (perfection);
65 Taking into account Gödel’s remarks before the 1970s, “fact” should not be just “syn-
thetic fact concerning sensations” (“empirical fact”), but also a fact “consisting in relations
between concepts” (Gödel, 1995a, p. 351, ftn. 41, pp. 355, 356) and a mathematical fact
(Gödel, 1995a, p. 337).
66 See, e.g., Gödel (1995f, p. 312, with ftn. 18) and Crocco et al (2017, 29).
67 Apparently, Gödel is in his ontology of force and fact primarily focused on the world
of empirical facts (Wang, 1996, 9.4.9 p. 312). However, it can be seen that, according to
Gödel, concepts, too, i.e., “generalities” are a “fundamental aspect of the world” (Wang,
1996, 9.1.24 p. 295). We will return to this in the following section, where we will outline
a possible Gödelian causal account of the “conceptual world” (Wang, 1996, 9.2.10 p. 299,
9.4.18 p. 316).
On Causality as the Fundamental Concept of Gödel’s Philosophy 21
4. the union of force and fact after the realization of a value (perfection), with
a “fulfilled wish”, and thus enjoyment, which correspond to this union.68
Again, God, as the cause of the world, may be assumed as a force, first, se-
parated from space at the beginning of the creation, and finally, as much as
possible united with space at the end of the creation (with as much being as
possible realized). Time of creation remains to be merely a subjective way that
the created things perceive the creation.
It should be noted that “possibility” in this new scheme has a more impor-
tant role than before. It seems to be for Gödel the next concept involved by
the concepts of force and fact, since it is understood as the “synthesis” of being
and non-being, and so the “synthesis” of force (which is directed to being of
something) and fact (which lacks the being of what has to be realized).69 The
concept of possibility will be analysed further below.
3 From logical objectivism to logical causalism
On the ground of Gödel’s texts, in this section, a reconstruction of the logical
aspect of foundational causal concepts is proposed, and some primitive logical
concepts analysed with respect to their causal content. A Gödelian causal
account of mind and understanding is outlined.
3.1 Causal meaning of logical concepts in general
The objective status of mathematical and logical truths is a well-known aspect
of Gödel’s Platonism. One basic philosophical result of the second incomplete-
ness theorem is, according to Gödel, that logical concepts, for example, “all”,
cannot be defined “in terms of the meaning of ‘proof’ ” (Gödel, 1995f, p. 313),
and, as mentioned above, that there are logical and mathematical “facts”, in
the sense that logical and mathematical concepts “form an objective reality of
their own, which we cannot create or change, but only perceive and describe”
(Gödel, 1995f, p. 320). Accordingly, concepts are objectively interrelated, form-
ing a “conceptual space”.70
In addition, Gödel envisages a further step, more “unpopular” than logical
and mathematical objectivism (Platonism) in general, which would consist in
showing that logical (and mathematical) objectivity has a causal structure,
that is, in explaining and defining logical and set-theoretical concepts in terms
of causality (see remark (3)). We follow Gödel’s remarks and hints about how
this could be conceived.
68 “A fulfilled wish is a union of wish and fact” (Wang, 1996, 9.4.3 p. 311).
69 See Wang (1996, 9.4.9-10 pp. 312-313).
70 Cf. “that the conclusion is implied by the premises is itself an objective fact concerning
the primitive terms of logic” (Gödel, 1995a, p. 350, ftn. 40, emphasis added). As expressed
in 1975, concepts “are related each in the other and form the ‘conceptual space’ ” (Wang,
1996, 4.4.7, p. 149).
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As a preliminary, it should be noted that Platonism and causalism are
connected in a natural way because of the Platonic causal conception of the
participation of things in “ideas” (concepts).71 As is known, later Plato criti-
cized the so called “doctrine of ideas” (“Platonism” in an ordinary sense) and
searched for a solution through a complicated theory of dynamic interrelations
between “ideas”, and between “ideas” and things (e.g., in the dialogues Sophist
and Parmenides; Gödel might refer to Sophist by mentioning Plato’s paradox
of falsehood, Crocco et al 2017, 21, ftn.72). Although a Platonic flavor can be
felt on many places in Gödel’s reflections, noticeable is Gödel’s cautious and
critical stance towards ordinary Platonism.73 As will be seen, contrary to ordi-
nary Platonism, for Gödel, concepts (Platonic “ideas”) are not objects and do
not cause objects, although concepts are things, embedded in objectivity and
its causal structures. On the other hand, contrary to Kant’s criticism, concepts
are not for Gödel merely subjective forms (such as time), but “constitute” true
objects (not just appearances), and are perceived in a sort of causal interac-
tion with mind (cf. p. 34, ftn. 113, below). Correspondingly, Gödel searched
for a general theory of concepts with a possible scientific causal foundation,
and for a phenomenological methodology of the perception of concepts and of
the justification of primitive concepts, aiming at an axiomatic form in order
to ultimately obtain an exact theory (cf. above Gödel’s remark (3) on p. 6,
and p. 7).
The step towards causal explanation of logical concepts seems to be for
Gödel much harder than establishing Platonistic objectivism (once the incom-
pleteness proof has been devised). The causal interpretation may be one of the
possibilities connected with the result of Gödel’s 1944 paper “Russell’s mathe-
matical logic” (Gödel, 1990d), according to which, even after simple theory of
types and axiomatic set theory were developed, “many symptoms show only
too clearly . . . that the primitive concepts [of logic] need further elucidation”
(Gödel 1990d, p. 140; Wang 1987, p. 311), that is, we dispose only with an
“incomplete understanding of the foundations” (Gödel, 1990d, p. 140). In par-
ticular, Gödel emphasizes (in 1944) the insufficient distinctness of the concept
of “concept”,74 and in the 1970s he complains about intensional paradoxes as
inherent in a general concept theory.75
71 For example, in his dialogue Phaedo, as indicated by a reviewer. See Plato (1964-1978,
I, Phaedo 100B-101C). Platonic “idea” is, for Gödel, the Platonic counterpart of “concept”
(Wang, 1996, 8.6.18 p. 277, cf. 5.3.15 p. 167).
72 Cf. Plato (1964-1978, VII, Sophist 239D-241B, 263B-C).
73 Cf. expressions like “a cautiously platonistic point of view” (Gödel, 1986-2003, vol. 4,
letter to Bernays, pp. 308-309), “a kind of Platonism, which cannot satisfy any critical mind”
(Gödel, 1995e, p. 50).
74 “[W]e don’t perceive the concepts of ‘concept’ and of ‘class’ with sufficient distinctness,
as is shown by the paradoxes” (Gödel, 1990d, pp. 139-140). According to Gödel, Russell
brought to light “the amazing fact that our logical intuitions (i.e., intuitions concerning such
notions as: truth, concept, being, class, etc.) are self-contradictory” (Gödel 1990d, p. 124;
cf. Wang 1996, 8.5.1 p. 269).
75 “When we formulate the paradoxes in terms of concepts clearly defined for everything,
we don’t see what is wrong” (Wang, 1996, 8.6.23 p. 278).
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According to Wang’s reports from the 1970s, Gödel was certain about at
least some primitive logical concepts. The aim of the following two partial
lists seems to be to present primitive concepts of logic (in the sense of concept
theory):
negation, existence, conjunction, universality, object, (the concept of)
concept, whole, meaning, and so on, (Wang, 1996, 9.1.26 p. 295)
negation, conjunction, existence, universality, object, the concept of
concept, the relation of something falling under some concept (or of
some concept applying to something), and so on.
(Wang, 1996, 8.6.17 p. 277)
Gödel especially emphasized the concept of existence as the “clearest” primitive
concept, “with which we must begin as given”.76 This still does not exclude
the possibility that such concepts be axiomatically described from the aspect
of their special causal role. In addition, it is not obvious that epistemological
priority (“clearness”) should always coincide with the logical, ontological or
causal priority.77
3.2 Basic logical concepts and causality
We will, first, analyse in which sense causal concepts of will, force, enjoyment,
God, time and space, for Gödel, could have some specific logical meaning. Se-
condly, we will consider particular logical concepts such as affirmation, nega-
tion, whole, part, subject, predicate, possibility, and necessity (Gödel mentions
some logical concepts in the context of the remark (3)). Taking their logical
meaning in a particular logic for granted, we will be interested in what could
their foundational causal meaning, for Gödel, consist of, independently of a
particular logic (cf. Gödel’s “abstract” or “absolute” concepts).78 As far as
Gödel’s remarks allow, a preliminary will be outlined for a possible Gödelian
causal theory of concepts.
3.2.1 Logical meaning of basic causal concepts
(1) For the logical meaning of will, let us turn to the assertive interpretation
of the positive (see p. 10 above), according to which positive properties are
76 In a remark from 1975 according to Wang, Gödel says: “The notion of existence is one
of the primitive concepts with which we must begin as given. It is the clearest concept we
have. Even ‘all’, as studied in predicate logic, is less clear, since we don’t have an overview
of the whole world” (Wang, 1996, 4.4.12 p. 150).
77 Cf. Max X: “Die hellsten Sterne [deutlichsten Begriffe] scheinen nicht die grössten [objek-
tiv grundlegendsten] zu sein, sondern diese werden durch Konstruktion aus den deutlichsten
gewonnen [ein Weg, z. B. der Nominalismus]” (Crocco et al, 2017, 3; “The brightest stars
[the most distinct concepts] do not seem to be the biggest ones [objectively most funda-
mental], but they are obtained by construction from the most distinct ones [one way, e.g.,
nominalism]” [our translation]).
78 See Gödel (1995c, pp. 382-385), Gödel (1990a, 272-273), and Gödel (1990c).
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understood as assertions (or “attributions”, as Gödel puts it in the 1970s),
and negative ones as privations. Thus, assertion should now be the proper
intentional “object” of will. It should be noted that “pure ‘attribution’ ” (former
“assertion”) is in 1970 defined as a property having the disjunctive normal form
with a disjunct without a negative conjunct (Gödel, 1995d, p. 404). Assuming
that logic is connected with intellect (Verstand), it should be noted that,
for Gödel, intellect has a “practical”, volitive, aspect since the intellect is,
in a judgement, making a choice between different possibilities, and should
acknowledge (“grant the being to”) what is actual (Gödel 2016, XIV 52-53;
Crocco et al 2017, 58).79 Moreover, in Max IX (Crocco, 2016), Gödel describes
concepts as “choosing” their objects to which they apply (this being the sense
of Platonistic “participation” of objects in “ideas”).
As to the logical meaning of the other ones of the five basic causal compo-
nents, we add some further remarks.
(2) Gödel points out that concepts “correspond” to forces, although concepts
are not themselves forces (forces are in the middle between concepts and indi-
viduals; Gödel, 2016, XV, p. 64).80 On the other side, epistemologically, con-
cepts are parts of, and can be implicitly defined by, axioms, which, as Gödel
sometimes implies, possess force: “[A]xioms force themselves upon us as being
true” (Gödel, 1990e, p. 268), what dynamically describes “causal connection
in the perception of concepts” (Wang, 1996, p. 189).
(3) Further, Gödel remarks that no “life-experience” (Erleben) corresponds to
concepts (Gödel, 2016, 96). Yet he speaks about the perfection and beauty of
“completely developed” parts of mathematics, and of the expected perfection
of the “conceptual world” (Wang, 1996, 9.4.18 p. 316, 9.4.22 p. 317). Enjoyment
(satisfaction) could be naturally associated with both of these perfections. Cer-
tainly, axioms or proven theorems could be naturally conceived as a fulfilment
of an intellectual goal (knowledge, truth).
(4) ‘To be God ’, in assertive interpretation, is defined in an entirely logical
way – as ‘having all and only assertions as properties’ (these properties by
themselves form a maximal consistent system).
(5) Time reflects (subjectively, in “thinking”) a direction in combining of con-
cepts: a present concept is being applied to a past (already given and known)
one (a predicate to a subject matter), a later concept to an earlier (as if already
given and known) one (Crocco et al, 2017, 2). In addition, the flow of time
itself “corresponds”, according to Gödel, to the “concluding” in God’s intel-
lect, that is, to the necessity of how the past (given premises) is conceptually
being complemented by the future (conclusions to be drawn) (Gödel, 2016,
79 A broad discussion about the logical role of will, decision, and approval/disapproval
developed in the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. A good
insight into the problem could be obtained from Gödel’s philosophy professor in Vienna,
Heinrich Gomperz (1897, pp. 64-70).
80 This clearly shows a weakening of ordinary Platonistic causality of “ideas”, and on the
other hand, a causal strengthening of Kant’s and phenomenological transcendentalism – a
characteristic middle position Gödel aims at, e.g., in Gödel (1995c).
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XIV 18-20 pp. 6-7).81 Gödel sometimes speaks of a “logical space” (empha-
sis added), “concept space”, or “space of ideas” (“Raum der Ideen”, “logischer
Raum”, “Begriffsraum”),82 which indicates that relations among concepts (if
concepts are put “near” to one another), could be conceived as forms of spa-
tial (non-)coexistence, such as compatibility and non-compatibility (cf. \Diamond as
compatibility in Gödel 1995d, pp. 403, 404).
3.2.2 Affirmation, negation.
Gödel’s examples of a pair (dipole), electron event, bodily organism and cre-
ated things (Crocco et al, 2017, 5-6, 7-8, 10, 12-15) clearly show how various
structures, in their causal life (e.g., by means of their intended perfecting,
attractive and repulsive forces, intake and emission, satiatedness and non-
satiatedness, etc.), affirm what contributes to the being of these structures,
and negate what destroys them.83 Besides, since the consequences of what is
wanted (intentional “object”) and is being realized may themselves be wanted
or unwanted, Gödel emphasizes that an additional “affirmation” (Bejahen) by
a “decision” (will) is requested (Gödel, 2016, XIV 51-52).
Similarly, it could be said that the “life” of an axiomatic system is a causal
“structure” where proofs affirm what belongs to the system (what could be
taken into the system as its theorems), while disproofs negate what does not
belong to it. Proving and disproving themselves are sometimes explicitly con-
81 Thus, Gödel not only endorsed Kant’s idea of the subjectivity of time, which he extended
(on the ground of the relativity theory) to the clear non-objectivity of time (see Gödel 1990b).
He also stood for a version of temporal “schematism” applied to primitive logical concepts
(for Kant, see especially Kant 1968, B 183-184). Cf. below on subject-predicate relationship
and implication (pp. 29 and 31). However, Gödel emphasizes that this is only the form of
the subjective aspect of logic (“thinking”), in distinction to the “form of objectively logical
relationships” (Crocco et al, 2017, 2).
82 See Crocco et al (2017, 44, 67, 69) and Gödel (2016, XIV 99). On the distinction between
concepts and Kantian (inexhaustible, direction-giving) ideas, see Wang (1996, pp. 268-269,
6.1.13 p. 188).
83 In the cosmological sense of the affirmation, the being as such should be affirmed in
order to start establishing the structure of the world. Cf.: “The affirmation of being is the
cause of the world [Das Bejahen des Seins ist die Ursache der Welt]. The first creature: to
being is added the affirmation of being. . . . as many [things] as possible will come to be . . . ”
(Gödel 1995d, pp. 432-433, slightly modified translation, and Gödel 2016, XIV 104).
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ceived by Gödel as causal affairs.84 Using Gödelian justification logic tools85
(with a causal interpretation), it is possible to make affirmation and negation
by proofs and disproofs explicit in the formulas of the shapes t:\phi (‘t proves
\phi ’) and t:\neg \phi (‘t disproves \phi ’).
3.2.3 Whole, part
Gödel ascribes (in the 1970s) a fundamental role to the concepts of whole and
part.86
“Whole” is generally described as a divisible unity (Wang, 1996, 9.1.25 p.
295). For instance, sets (if not singletons) are just a “limiting case of wholes”
since they “are unities which are just the multitude” (Wang, 1996, 9.1.28 p.
296). In distinction, a concept (if not a simple one, like a primitive concept),
“is a whole in a stronger sense than sets; it is a more organic whole” (Wang,
1996, 9.1.26 p. 295).
One aspect of the causal meaning of a whole seems to lie for Gödel in the
composing and combining parts into a whole (Zusammensetzung, Kombina-
tion, Crocco et al 2017, 1, 2; but see Gödel 2016, XV p. 65). Logically, the
whole-part relationship characterizes the content of a concept, where logical
concepts are the “putty” that “holds together” (zusammenhalten) the compo-
nents of a concept. This “holding <something> together”, which is, according
to Gödel, “the formal, namely the structure”, seems to imply a sort of “corre-
sponding” force and causality.87
84 E.g., Gödel speaks of the “causation in mathematics, in the sense of, say, a fundamental
theorem causing its consequences” (Wang, 1996, 9.5.6 p. 320). Similarly, Wang reports that
Gödel “. . . once said to me that there is a sense of cause according to which axioms cause
theorems. It seems likely that Gödel has in mind something like Aristotle’s conception of
cause or aitia which includes both causes and reasons” (Wang, 1996, p. 120). Of course, in
accordance with a reviewer’s remark, one should trace the idea of reasons as causes further
back to Plato. Cf., in particular, the stress on the unstable, changing and moving character
of arguments (“reasons”), for instance, in the dialogue Euthyphron (Plato, 1964-1978, I,
11C-E); Gödel refers to this dialogue in the 1970s (Toledo, 2011).
It is a natural consequence of Platonistic objectivism to conceive reasons as causes, since
the implication relation between reasons and consequents should also be understood as some-
thing objective, and hence, most naturally, as causation. Concepts, reasons, and causes, as
well as logic, epistemology, and ontology, get intrinsically and systematically interconnected
(the possibility of an ontological proof is one of the consequences).
85 See Gödel (1995h), Artemov and Yavorskaya (Sidon) (2011), and Fitting (2014). For a
causal interpretation, see (Kovač, 2015).
86 “Whole and part . . . are most fundamental in our conceptual system” (Wang, 1996, 9.1.24
p. 295).
87 “Insbesondere bilden bei der Analyse eines Begriffes in seine Bestandteile die logischen
Begriffe ‘den Kitt’, welcher sie zusammenhält. In diesem Sinn sind sie das ‘Formale’, nämlich
die Struktur der Bestandteile” (Crocco et al, 2017, 1, ftn.). (“In particular, in the analysis
of a concept into its components, the logical concepts build the ‘putty’ which holds them
together. In this sense, they are the ‘formal’, that is, the structure of the components” [our
translation]). – Since, obviously, whole is a sort of numerical (not distributive) identity,
Gödel counts it to “extensional” unity (characterized by “contact” or “partition”) (Gödel,
2016, XV, pp. 57, 62).
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Another aspect of the causal meaning of a whole consists in the increa-
sing of the “being” of parts by establishing their harmony.88 Hence, Gödel
sometimes calls harmony (“agreement”, Übereinstimmung) of parts “reality”,
and disharmony (nonagreement, Nichtübereinstimmung) of parts “privation”
(a negative property) (Gödel, 2016, XIV 117).89
Continuing the comparison with justification logic (in its causal version),
the whole-part relationship can be understood as reflected by the operators of
application and sum. Application operation, \cdot , can be interpreted as expressing
a harmonic “holding together” of parts \phi and \psi – t:\phi \rightarrow (u:\psi \rightarrow ((c\cdot t)\cdot u): (\phi \wedge 
\psi )) (c being a logical reason for the axioms of the shape \phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\phi \wedge \psi ))).
Sum operation, +, allows disharmony and mutual exclusion of parts \phi and \psi 
– t:\phi \rightarrow (u:\psi \rightarrow (d \cdot (t+ u)): (\phi \vee \psi )), with possibly \psi = \neg \phi (d being a logical
reason for the axioms of the shape \phi \rightarrow (\phi \vee \psi ) and \psi \rightarrow (\phi \vee \psi )).
3.2.4 General, particular
In the 1970s, Gödel also ascribes a fundamental role to the concepts of “the
universal” and “the particular”.90
Gödel gives the following explanation of “the general” (a reflection from
the 1970s; Wang 1996, 9.4.5 p. 312). He starts from the proposition:
Force is connected to objects and a concept represents repetition of
objects,
and continues:
The general is that which holds the individual objects together.
In addition, Gödel states that “. . . since there is similarity, there are genera-
lities” (“existence of concepts \equiv existence of a similarity”, Gödel 2016, XV p.
62). This seems to indicate that some (attractive) force “connected to objects”
is needed to hold objects together, in correspondence with their repetition
and similarity (i.e., partial identity, Gödel 2016, XV, p. 62; XIV 121). The
“holding together” on the ground of similarity differs in meaning from the
“holding together” of parts within a whole.91 Similarity, on which the general
is based, is not just repetition (of a common trait in distinct objects), but,
88 Harmony implies “more being” than disharmony, which, in turn, means “cancellation” of
being – if parts are in opposition (“disharmony”), their being is cancelled (“der Gegensatz der
Teile hebt ihr Sein auf”, Gödel 1995d, p. 432, Phil IX 104). For the relatedness of harmony
to enjoyment, see p. 12 above.
89 It should be noted that the causal meaning of the whole-part relationship is evident in
Kant’s corresponding category of “reciprocal influence” (Wechselwirkung), “deduced” from
the logical form of disjunctive judgement as a relation of (exclusive) disjunctive whole and
its disjuncts.
90 “Generalities are just a fundamental aspect of the world. It is a fundamental fact of reality
that there are two kinds of reality: universals and particulars (or individuals)” (Wang, 1996,
9.1.24 p. 295).
91 Cf. Max IX on concepts as what “holds the world together” (“hält . . . zusammen”) in
Crocco (2016, p. 140, 142).
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in distinction to sets, obviously some stronger unity of objects.92 What Gödel
might have in mind is that a general concept contains, besides some common
mark, also the indication of ways it could “fall apart” and be further specialized
(Gödel, 2016, XIV 89), that is, of the ways of its application.
On the other hand, the particular should, evidently, be understood from
some “cause of the difference of things” (to hold things apart from one an-
other; emphasis added) – and this is, according to the context of remark (3),
properties.93
The causal structure of the “holding objects together” by generality can be
nicely depicted by the generalization operator genx(t) borrowed from causally
interpreted justification logic. The formula t:\phi , where x does not occur free
in t (but can occur in \phi ; the proviso is slightly different in justification logic
proper), expresses the similarity of the causation of \phi by t irrespective of which
object x formula \phi is about. Axiom scheme t:\phi \rightarrow genx(t): \forall x\phi allows for the
generalization of t to the general cause genx(t), which “holds together” all
objects x under the conceptual configuration \phi .
As already quoted, Gödel concluded that “causation is fundamental; it
should also explain the general and the particular” (Wang, 1996, 9.4.5 p. 312).
With the “general”, Gödel arrives at the essence of a concept:
The general idea of concept is just generality.
(Wang, 1996, 8.4.22 p. 269)
It seems that it should be allowed to generalize Gödel’s remarks on “general”
and “particular” not only to first-order concepts (concepts of objects) but
to concepts in general.94 However, Gödel confirms that, because of intrinsic
reasons (intensional paradoxes), he did not come to some satisfactory general
theory of concepts (pp. 32, 22).
Remark If we abstract from the intrinsic problems of a general concept theory
(cf. Wang 1996, pp. 278-279), the distinctions “general – particular” and “whole
– part”, if taken with respect to the things (beings, unities) in general, can
explain the motivation for Gödel’s divisions of things, first, into concepts as
universals, and objects as particulars (sets, monads, material/spacio-temporal
objects), as well as, secondly, into wholes and simple things (e.g., monads, unit
sets, empty set, primitive concepts).95
92 Gödel says that “a concept represents repetition of objects”, but also that mere “mul-
tiplicity (or repetition) is mathematics, which does not take primary place in this scheme”
(Wang, 1996, 9.4.5-6 p. 312).
93 “Property = cause of the difference of things” (Gödel 1995d, pp. 432-435; Gödel 2016,
XIV 105). This certainly also reflects the Platonistic view of things as depending on (par-
ticipating in) properties as concepts (Plato’s “ideas”).
94 “[A] concept A applies to something B (which may also be a concept)” (Wang, 1996,
8.6.18 p. 277). On self-applicability of concepts, see Wang (1996, 8.6.3 p. 274, 8.6.23 p. 278).
95 See Wang (1996, 9.1.25 p. 295, 9.1.27-28 p. 296, 8.6.25 p. 279).
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3.2.5 Subject, predicate
The way how our intellect “acknowledges” the actual in a judgement (p. 24
above) Gödel more precisely determines as the “transition” (Übergang) to the
representation of an object that is the subject (Gegenstand) of predication.
Thus, the directedness (Gerichtetsein) towards something “outer” (object),
which is already given and known, is established (Gödel, 2016, XIV 39-40).
This structure is temporally reflected in the past-present relationship, where
a (given and known) subject (past) cannot be influenced on, and where, in
turn, this subject influences what can be predicated of it (Crocco et al 2017,
22; Gödel 2016, XIV 17, 19). Thus, subject and predicate are connected in a
causal unity (“both become one”, the unity being expressed by est) (Crocco
et al, 2017, 65).96
Additionally, if a subject is itself referred to by a subject concept (as in
subject-predicate sentences of natural language or, for example, of Kantian
logic), it can be noticed that, for Gödel, the subject (in “synthetic proposi-
tions”), or subject concept (in “analytic propositions”), “contain” (enthalten,
“hold in”) a predicate. This “containedness” (Enthaltensein) should also be
causally conceived as a sort of logical “putty” (Gödel 2016, XIV 116-117; cf.
footnote 87 on p. 26 above).97
3.2.6 Necessity, possibility, implication
In Phil XIV, the concept of necessity means that “something follows from mere
concepts”, and is synonymous with “understandability” (Verständlichkeit)
(Gödel, 2016, XIV 118):
Necesarily \phi \Leftarrow \Rightarrow it follows from mere concepts that \phi .
“Following” happens by means of axioms and rules, and axioms need not be
tautologies (“reducible to a = a”, “void of content”), but can themselves “follow
from the meaning of the primitive terms under consideration” (Gödel, 1995f,
pp. 320-321). In other words, “following”, and thus necessity, obtain analyti-
cally, not just tautologically. Further, since “generality” and “whole”, on which
concepts are based, have a causal meaning (as outlined above), it follows that
“necessity”, too, should be based on the causal meaning of concepts, that is,
exactly on the ways how they have to “hold together” their parts as well as
the objects they refer to.
96 According to the previous analyses, unity is in general a goal intended by will (see p. 10
above), and its realization should be immanent to an applied “holding” force. Let us add that
there is a connection of Gödel’s temporal schematism with Kant’s. In Kant’s schematism of
categories, “substance” (corresponding to “subject”) is schematized by the persistence (un-
changeability) in time, and “accident” (corresponding to predicate) by changeability (Kant,
1968, B 183). Of course, past is unchangeable, and future seems to be changeable.
97 See Crocco et al (2017, 71).
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Gödel sometimes describes the dual concept possibility as “compatibility”
of properties or of a “system of properties” (Gödel, 1995d, pp. 403, 404).98 In
accordance with the concept of necessity, this should also be understood with
respect to the meaning of primitive concepts, that is, analytically:99
Possibly \phi \Leftarrow \Rightarrow \neg (it follows from mere concepts that \neg \phi ).
Accordingly, the causal sense of possibility should be that there are ways some-
thing (\phi ) can be conceptually “held together”.
In Phil XIV, Gödel makes the causal meaning of “possibility” more ex-
plicit by grounding it in the activity and free will, by means of which, even
in cognition, “we” participate in God’s creation and build the world out of
concepts. As Gödel emphasizes, “an entirely passive being . . . would have no
real understanding of the concept of the possible” (Gödel, 2016, XIV 78, our
translation). Conceptual possibility is part of the creation (where we parti-
cipate through our activity and free will), which is obviously a causal affair.
– In distinction, in the empirical world (and in the temporal schematism of
conceptual world as well), as may be concluded from the analysis of the causal
components in general, possibility consists (a) in the temporal directedness:
something is possible on the ground of the past, and it is impossible to influ-
ence back on the past, as well as (b) in the spatial nearness (contiguity) of
the causal components (in order to be able to interact).100
There is an essential distinction of Gödel’s concept of necessity and Leib-
niz’s concept, which is based on the principle of contradiction, and hence,
reduces necessity (and the dual concept of possibility) to tautologies.101 This
is the reason why the first part of Gödel’s ontological proof (1970), that is,
the proof of the possibility of a “God-like” being, is different from Leibniz’s
proof of the possibility of God. Gödel’s proof is based on the axiomatic de-
scription of the second-order property of positivity, obtained from the intuition
of the “positive”, rather than just on the simplicity, unanalysability, and thus
non-contradictoriness of “perfection”.
“Modal collapse”. What is (somewhat misleadingly) called “modal collapse”
theorem (\phi \updownarrow \Box \phi ) of Gödel’s onto-theological system (e.g. from 1970, see
Sobel 2004, pp. 134-135) does not cancel the conceptual distinction between
possibility, necessity and actuality, but merely states what is causally expressed
98 The concept “possible, not necessary” is also encountered, in the sense of “compatibility”
(cf. verträglich) of \phi (A) as well as \neg \phi (A) with the essence of the same “being” (Gödel, 2016,
XIV 5). Cf. p. 25 above.
99 See, e.g., Crocco et al (2017, 41).
100 See footnote 51 on p. 15 above.
101 “When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into simpler
ideas and simpler truths until we reach the primitives. . . . And there are, finally, simple ideas,
whose definition cannot be given. There are also axioms and postulates, in brief, primitive
principles, which cannot be proved and which need no proof. And these are identical propo-
sitions, whose opposite contains an explicit contradiction” (cf. Leibniz 1978a, Monadologie,
§§33, 35 p. 612; translation from Leibniz 1989, p. 217).
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by the “maximum principle for the fulfilling of wishes”, that is, for the rea-
lization of each conceivable “good” (possibly, with all the “bad” of “this life” as
a necessary precondition).102 Cosmologically expressed, this principle means
that the “building up of the world” (which is a causal affair) should ultimately
lead (as if at the end of time) to the “best possible” world.103 The realization of
the maximum is, according to Gödel, due to the meaningfulness (rationality) of
the creation of the world, and to the non-limited capacities of human learning
and development to “attain a better existence” (Engelen 2016, pp. 171-172;
Wang 1996, p. 106, 9.4.8 p. 312, 9.4.18-20 pp. 316-317).104
Implication. One of the ways possibilites can themselves be included in a for-
mal structure is implication. According to Gödel, implication, like a subject-
predicate proposition, expresses “containedness” (Enthaltensein), but in dis-
tinction, it is a logical “putty” between two “mere possibilities”, one of which,
the hypothesis, “contains” another one, the consequence.105 Here the hypothe-
sis need not refer to something already given in the past (subject) but merely
to something possible (maybe just in the future), and the hypothesis should be
at least conceptually prior to its consequence. Thus, it seems that the causal
dependence in an implication could be properly temporally reflected in the
pair earlier-later.106
3.3 Antinomies and causality
The Gödelian causal account of logical primitive terms might throw some
additional light on logical antinomies. The following three examples show how
antinomies violate causal relationships conceived in a Gödelian way.
In the sentence S: ‘This sentence is false’ of the Liar paradox, the subject
term seems to be ‘this sentence’, that is, S itself (‘x which is S is false’). In the
subject-predicate relationship, the subject (x which is S) should be already
given (past) and known, unchangeable under the influence of the predicate
(future). However, in sentence S, the subject changes under the influence of its
predicate (the past-future structure of causality is violated): by the predicate
“false”, S, as the subject, becomes true, and as true, S becomes false. Hence,
sentence S does not have a subject (S itself), and thus S is not a given sentence.
Russell’s antinomical concept w: “to be a predicate that cannot be predi-
cated of itself” contains conflicts of similarity and predication, and of partition
102 “[T]he short period of misery may even be necessary for the whole” (Wang, 1996, 9.4.20
p. 317).
103 On connections between the so-called “modal collapse” and Gödel’s version of a “sling-
shot” argument from 1944, see Kovač and Świe˛torzecka (2015).
104 See below, p. 35, on the non-reducibility of mind to a machine.
105 See Gödel (2016, XIV 53, 117; cf. XV, p. 65).
106 Similarly, for Kant, the antecedent and the consequent in a “hypothetical judgement”
have only the value of logical possibility (“problematic” modality) (Kant, 1968, B 100).
Also, the temporal schema of the category of causality (corresponding to the hypothetical
judgement) is a regular succession in time (Kant, 1968, B 183).
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and predication. (1) If w should, by similarity, “hold together” (causality!) w
and everything else that is a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself, then
w becomes predicated of itself, and thus should not be “held together” with
other predicates that cannot be predicated of themselves. If w should not, by
dissimilarity, “hold” w together with everything that is a predicate that cannot
be predicated of itself, then w applies, that is, becomes predicated, to itself,
and thus should be “held together” with all other predicates that cannot be
predicated of themselves. Therefore, w should hold itself by not holding itself,
and vice versa, that is, w is causally impossible. (2) A similar argument to (1)
shows that the intended content of w is causally impossible, since w should
“hold” itself as a part in its own content if and only if it does not “hold” itself
as such a part.
For Gödel, there is an essential difference between the Liar and Russell’s
paradox. The first one is semantical and depends on language; it could be said
that expression S “says nothing”. But the second one is intensional, indepen-
dent of language. Despite the contradictions, paradoxically, it is still possible
to found w “perfectly reasonable” (Wang, 1996, 8.5.12 pp. 271-272). For in-
stance, we can still speak about various self-applicable and non-self-applicable
concepts.
Finally, it would be intereseting to ask if there is at all some concept of not
being applicable to everything (“to every entity [which may be an object or a
function (a concept)]”, Wang 1996, 8.6.25 p. 279), that is, in Gödel’s terms, of
“non-regularity”. Gödel’s paradox (1972), as Wang named it, shows that this
concept, too, leads to antinomy (Wang, 1996, 9.6.24-25 p. 279) and is, on the
present analysis, causally untenable. As reported by Wang, Gödel introduced a
“dot” function, roughly, “regularity” of a concept (of a function f), according to
which f.x = f(x) if f is regular, otherwise f.x = 0, and a sort of negation, E,
according to which E(x) = 0 if x \not = 0, otherwise E(x) = 1. Clearly, E(x) \not = x.
Since E is regular,
E(x.x).E(x.x) = E(E(x.x).E(x.x)), (4)
despite the fact that, in general, E(x) \not = x. This result means that the regu-
larity of non-regularity of x, E(x.x).E(x.x), gives its own negation, E(E(x.x).
E(x.x)), and vice versa, which is logically-causally untenable (similarly to Rus-
sell’s w). Note that E(x.x) = 1 simply means non-regularity of x, x.x = 0,
not necessarily non-self-applicability of x (x.x may give 0 even if x(x) holds
– non-regularity of x suffices for value 0). E(x.x) = 0 means regularity of x.
Thus, E(x.x).E(x.x) = 1 means regularity of E(x.x), that is, the regularity
of non-regularity of x. Therefore, the question whether “non-regularity of x”
is applicable to each x (i.e., whether “non-regularity of x” is regular) is anti-
nomic, and the sole concept of such a regularity would be a violation of logical
causality. This is an indication that, although we, with not quite clear intu-
ition, refer to the “concept of concept” (Wang 1987, p. 297; Wang 1996, 8.4.17
p. 267), its range (the domain for the regularity function) does not form a set.
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3.4 “Function” of a category in general
Let us now turn to the primitive logical concepts in general on the ground
of Gödel’s remark about Kant’s categories (understood in (3) as logical con-
cepts).107 Gödel’s description of Kantian “function” of a category in general,
if analysed a bit closer, reveals some similarities with the causal structure
described in remark (3)
. . . the function of both [the concept of set and the categories of pure
understanding in Kant’s sense] is “synthesis”, i.e., the generating of uni-
ties out of manifolds (e.g., in Kant, of the idea of one object out of its
various aspects). (Gödel, 1990e, p. 268, ftn. 40)
This description can be, somewhat loosely, connected with the five causal com-
ponents of (3) as follows: (1) The “function” of categories could be conceived
as presupposing some will (in Kant, it is just consciousness108), directed to
a unity.109 (2) This unity should be established by an activity of “genera-
ting”, “synthesis”, as if presupposing some forming “force” to carry out this
activity.110 (3) The function of unity is “satisfied” by an eventually generated
concept of one object. (4) Some subject (“created creator”) should be assumed
that carries out this synthetic activity (for Gödel, it could be “active intellect”,
for Kant, it is “I”, just a formal thinking subject).111 (5) What is presupposed
is also a “manifold”, “various aspects” (as already given before synthesis, for
Kant, in space and time) that are being united into the concept of an object.
We will now show that a causal interpretation of Kantian synthetic function
(whether it is the interpretation just outlined, or some similar one) can be
confirmed by Gödel’s explicit views. According to Gödel, the above intuitions
of a functional synthetic activity should not be conceived as “something purely
subjective”, but “may represent an aspect of objective reality”. This reality need
not be sensibly given: the “presence [of ‘abstract elements’] in us may be due
to another kind of relationship between ourselves and reality”, distinct from
“actions of certain things upon our sense organs” (Gödel, 1990e, p. 268).112
Such “relationship” is in another place more precisely determined as “a causal
107 See footnote 14 on p. 6 above.
108 Cf. footnote 61 on p. 18 above.
109 “By a function . . . I understand the unity of the action of ordering different represen-
tations under a common one” (Kant, 1968, B 93). Kant speaks, correspondingly, of the
“function of unity” in a judgement containing a predicated concept – for example Kant
(1968, B 94).
110 Cf. Gödel’s expression like “forming of unities” (Wang, 1996, 8.3.1 p. 260) or: “we form
our ideas” of objects (Gödel, 1990e, p. 268, emphasis added). Cf. pairs force – space and
form – matter above in subsections 2.2.5 and 2.2.7.
111 Gödel understands “I” (Ich) as an active (“efficient”) principle (das wirkende Prinzip).
See Engelen (2016, p. 179, ftn. 33, Max VI 381). For the active intellect, see footnote 113,
p. 34 below.
112 “Kantian intuition is too weak a concept of idealization of our real intuition. I prefer
a strong concept of idealization of it. . . . Understanding a primitive concept is by abstract
intuition” (Wang, 1996, 7.1.13 p. 217). Cf. also in Gomperz (1897, pp. 86-103).
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connection in the perception of concepts”.113 Accordingly, the generating of
unities, that is, the synthesis of a manifold in the concept of one object, may
be part of a causal structure of “objective reality”, which includes a causal
interrelationship between the objectivity and our mind. Therein, our mind has
an active causal role, and is at the same time influenced by objectivity through
the perception of concepts. First, what our mind is actually doing, according
to Gödel, is “singling out”, “selecting” (defining, determining), objects “out of
objectivity”.114 On the other hand, the singling out of objects is restricted
by the represented objectivity: not every manifold can be united at will in
one object, for instance, because of possible inconsistencies.115 Finally, once
the objects are selected, their relations become a determined part of a causal
structure (Wang, 1996, p. 303-304).
3.5 Causal understanding
Besides a Turing machine, which can be designed so as to write all the theorems
of a given well-defined axiomatic system (Gödel, 1995f, p. 308), Gödel had in
mind some non-mechanical procedure of understanding (intuiting) concepts
(especially abstract ones) in order to write down new axioms “explicating”
these concepts. It should be noted that a Turing machine itself can be easily
put in correspondence with the causal structure of remark (3): (1) it is based
on a “will” which is “remembered” in a finite number of internal states (with
associated instructions) to possibly compute some function f(x1, . . . , xn); (2)
this computation is carried out by the “force” of a machine that is capable
113 “I believe there is a causal connection in the perception of concepts. ... Already noûs in
Aristotle is a causal affair”; “the active intellect works on the passive intellect which some-
how shadows what the former is doing and helps us as a medium” (Wang 1996, 7.3.14 p.
235, 6.1.22 p. 189, emphasis added). Eva-Maria Engelen has shown that Gödel’s reception
of Aristotle’s doctrine of the “intellect” is mediated through Thomas Aquinas’ commentary
on Aristotle’s De Anima; see Engelen (2013). Cf. also: “Concepts are not the moving force
of the world but may act on the mind in some way” (Wang, 1996, 4.4.7 p. 149, emphasis
added). – There is Husserl’s, to some extent analogous, distinction between “active” and
“passive genesis” of a transcendental subject (“I”); i.e, new objects are being “constituted”
by active genesis on the ground of objects already given in the passive genesis. Although
Husserl concedes, in the broadest sense of the word, “causal” character of the genesis of the
transcendental “I”, he prefers, in parallel with psychology, to speak about “motivation”, this
also “in contrast” to causality as pertaining to reality, which “transcends” the phenomeno-
logical sphere (Husserl 1995, §38 pp. 79-82, §37 p. 77; Husserl 2002, p. 89 with ftn. 1).
114 “Out of objectivity we define objects in different ways. Faced with objectivity, how to
single out objects is your own child. . . . [I]n physics objects are almost uniquely determined
by objectivity, if you want to do it in the ‘natural’ way” (Wang, 1996, 9.2.40 p. 303). However,
“there is a large gap between objectivity and objects: given the fact of objectivity, there may
be other possibilities of selecting objects which we don’t know yet” (Wang, 1996, 9.2.43 p.
304). This might be a late shape of an earlier view (Max IX) on concepts as “choosing” their
objects (Crocco, 2016).
115 “Some pluralities can be thought together as unities, some cannot. Hence, there must be
something objective in the forming of unities” (Wang, 1996, 8.3.1 p. 260). Correspondingly,
Gödel mentions “absolutely infinite or inconsistent multitudes” leading to a contradiction,
in distinction to a “consistent multitude” (Wang, 1996, 8.3.6 p. 261).
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of reading, writing, erasing, moving, and changing its internal states, accor-
ding to the instruction at a given internal state; (3) the computational task
is “satisfied” when the machine halts in a standard final configuration; (4)
the whole computing event depends on the designer (“creator”) of the Turing
machine; and (5) the “space” in which the computation is being carried out,
in some (possibly infinite) sequence of time moments, is a (possibly infinite)
tape where initially the arguments are written for which the function should
be computed.116
It was a consequence of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and of his episte-
mological optimism (“rationalism”) that, “likely”, “working of the mind” cannot
be reduced to the working of finite machines, since, “if the mind were a ma-
chine”, mind could not “understand its own mechanism” (e.g., its own consis-
tency), and there would be “absolutely unsolvable” number-theoretic questions
(not just for a given arithmetic system, but “for the human mind” at all).117
Accordingly, Gödel conceived human mind as “constantly developing” towards
the infinity of abstract concepts (terms), of their precision, and of mind’s in-
ternal states.
As previously mentioned, according to Gödel’s idea of causality as the fun-
damental concept, the understanding of concepts should be a sort of reduction
of their meaning to causal terms.118 Thus, the understanding of the under-
standing of concepts itself should be a sort of reduction of understanding to
causal terms, and so, to the understanding of human mind (which is the agent
of understanding) by means of some non-mechanical counterpart of a Turing
machine. On the basis of Gödel’s remarks, one option that might be taken
into account is Gödel’s picture of a causal structure with the “active intellect”
working on the “passive intellect” (see above footnote 113 on p. 34).
Following this approach and relying on or extending slightly what may be
found in Gödel’s remarks, we could distinguish in the structure of the un-
derstanding of a human mind (1) an initial intention (will) directed towards
the understanding of some concept, with the growing number (converging to
infinity) of “distinguishable states of mind” carrying this intention; (2) the ca-
pacity (“force”) of “effective thinking”, for example, to attend to how we use
a concept, to idealize and disregard “the imprecision in what is actual”, to
116 For the importance of Turing’s informal but rigorous clarification of the concept of
computability by means of a Turing machine, see in Kennedy (2014): the precise general
notion of a formal system was established only on the ground of Turing’s “sharpening of
intuition” in his “informal analysis” of the concept of mechanical procedure. See, e.g., Gödel
(1990c) and Gödel (1986, p. 195, note from 1963).
117 See Wang (1996, 6.1.8 pp. 186-187) and Gödel (1995f, p. 310). Cf. “mind is not me-
chanical”; i.e., “evident” mathematical axioms “cannot be embodied in a finite rule” (Wang,
1996, 6.1.10 p. 187). – Here is an essential difference from Leibniz: Leibniz’s “universal cha-
racteristic”, according to Gödel, cannot exist, because “any systematic procedure for solving
problems of all kinds must be nonmechanical” (Wang, 1996, 6.3.16 p. 202). However, see
Gödel (1990d, pp. 140-141).
118 “We perceive objects and understand concepts. Understanding is a different kind of
perception: it is a step in the direction of reduction to the last cause” (Wang, 1996, 7.3.12 p.
235). Cf. also: “Sets are objects but concepts are not objects” (Wang, 1996, 7.3.12 p. 235).
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repeat119 – starting from the attention to a mechanical procedure;120 (3) a
satisfying state of the understanding of a concept, reached in the explication
of the concept by axioms (or just by its definition);121 (4) God and the active
intellect (the active intellect is believed by Gödel to be physically located in
some place in the brain122), which is God’s agent;123 they create and “hold
together” the causal structure of understanding; (5) “passive intellect” (having
no specific location in the brain; see Engelen, 2016), on which the “active intel-
lect” works (as on a “tape”), with some data recorded, and otherwise “blank”.
The main difference between mind and machine is, according to Gödel,
consciousness, which is “connected with one unity”, in contrast to a machine,
which is “composed of parts” (Wang, 1996, 6.1.21 p. 189).124 Perhaps exactly
this possibility of “holding”, in consciousness, a whole understanding proce-
dure united by means of the connectedness with “one unity” is what makes it
possible for a human mind to obtain the evidence of the axioms that would
otherwise inevitably remain undecided. This in distinction to a machine, which,
as divided into a finite number of parts, can lose the whole of the procedure
from its “attention” (halting problem).
Whereas the causal procedure of a Turing machine is easily learnable, the
procedure of the functioning of the understanding mind while explicating con-
cepts, according to Gödel, is highly internal and personal,125 and so even
hardly learnable from others. We are far from being able to describe exactly
a procedure of the understanding of concepts. For help, Gödel returns to phe-
nomenology and Kant.126 The intention is that by further perfecting the phe-
nomenological approach, the learning of a procedure of concept understanding
119 “Effective thinking” consists in “introspection and correct thinking”, and it mainly con-
sists in paying attention to “what you have to disregard”: “you have to know what to leave
out; this is the essence of effective thinking” (Wang, 1996, 9.2.4 p. 298). See also Wang
(1996, 9.2.19 p. 300, 9.2.22 p. 301), and p. 2 above.
120 “[A]sking the right questions on the basis of mechanical procedure” (Wang, 1996, 6.3.15
p. 200).
121 It is not a concept itself that is the effect of understanding, but the axiomatic explication
of the concept. Cf. “[I]dealization . . . is not the cause of the concepts” (Wang, 1996, 9.2.19
p. 300).
122 See Wang (1996, 7.3.5 p. 233, 7.3.13-15 p. 235). This may be connected with Gödel’s
idea that our brain could be a “computing machine connected with a spirit” (Wang 1996,
6.1.19 p. 189; Wang 1996, 6.1.14 p. 193).
123 Cf. “The reason . . . as an advisory being inherent to us”, which would be in a sense, “the
‘object’ or at least the cause of our conceptual cognition”. Further, the “advisory reason”
(active intellect, noÜc poihtikìc ) appears, in a way, as an “an emissary of God” (Crocco et al,
2017, 86, our translation and emphasis).
124 According to Leibniz, perception, however indistinct, is “inexplicable” by a machine,
because what is found in the interior of a machine are just “pieces that push on one another”
(Leibniz, 1978a, §17 p. 609, emphasis added).
125 Cf. noÜc as “highest liveliness [höchste Lebendigkeit ] (namely person)” (Crocco et al,
2017, 87).
126 “The understanding of the system of primitive terms and their relationships cannot be
transferred from one person to another. The purpose of reading Husserl should be to use
his experience to get to this understanding more quickly” (Toledo, 2011, p. 200). See also
Wang (1996, 5.3.28-31 pp. 169-170). For the phenomenological approach, independently of
the causality concept, see, e.g., section 6 of Tieszen (2016).
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could be further improved, enabling us to acquire a more precise knowledge of
how to achieve a possible axiomatic description of concepts.
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